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IMPORTANT ISSUE 
Peter C. Carstensen* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The recently promulgated Horizontal Merger Guidelines explicitly 
recognize that mergers creating undue buyer power should be challenged 
under the Clayton Act’s prohibition of anticompetitive mergers.  While this 
is an important step forward by the enforcement agencies, the relatively 
brief statement fails to articulate a coherent and complete framework for 
evaluating mergers that create buyer power.  This article provides an 
inclusive evaluation of the competitive issues raised by such mergers.  It 
starts by identifying the reasons why buyers with relatively modest market 
shares can—and often do—have substantial power.  As the active force in 
making market decisions, buyers can have significant discretion with 
respect to when, what, and from whom they make purchases.  Moreover, 
the incentives that frequently constrain exploitation of seller power are 
weaker or absent on the buying side.  Hence, interdependent and unilateral 
exploitation are more likely.  The article identifies the wide range of 
competitive harms that can arise from the exploitation of buyer power.  It 
then fits those harms into the framework of the Guidelines to demonstrate 
that investigations of buyer power must take account of a large number of 
potential anti-competitive effects, both on the direct sellers and on their 
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upstream suppliers, well beyond the concerns customarily examined in 
seller merger cases.  This analysis then examines market definition as 
applied to the selling side of the market to emphasize the importance of 
viewing markets from a seller’s perspective.  The foregoing analysis leads 
to the conclusion that mergers creating buyer power should trigger concern 
at lower levels of concentration than is customary in contemporary selling 
side merger analysis.  Finally, the article reviews some key defenses 
commonly seen in merger cases to show that they also need to be adapted 
to the economic realities of buyer side mergers. 
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PROLOGUE 
 In the fall of 2009, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department announced that they would commence a 
review of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines which were last 
comprehensively revised in 1992.
1
  One of the primary goals of the review 
process was to “reflect and incorporate learning and experience gained 
since 1992.”
2
  In light of that goal, it was striking that neither in the 
questions the agencies posed in their Questions for Public Comment
3
 nor, 
so far as I have learned, in the panels created at the various workshops, did 
the agencies address the analysis of mergers that affect the buying side of 
the market.  This omission was even more striking in light of Question 
Twelve in their questions for comment that recognized that “large buyers” 
can “negotiate more favorable terms” in comparison with other, equally 
efficient, but smaller firms.
4
  Yet, nothing in the other questions asked 
whether mergers that create such buying power ought to be subject to a 
focused and specific analysis. 
This failure was consistent with the very limited discussion of buyer-
side effects in the then existing guidelines.  The 1992 Guidelines only 
reference to buying-side merger effects was: 
The exercise of market power by buyers (“monopsony power”) 
has adverse effects comparable to those associated with the 
exercise of market power by sellers.  In order to assess potential 
monopsony concerns, the Agency will apply an analytical 
framework analogous to the framework of these Guidelines.
5
 
Since 1992, however, the agencies, in particular the DOJ, have 
brought several merger cases with major or even exclusive buying side 
orientation.
6
  The market analysis and competitive effects analysis implicit 
 
 1. Press Release, FTC, FTC and Department of Justice to Hold Workshops 
Concerning Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa 
/2009/09/mgr.shtm. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: QUESTIONS 
FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 2 (2009) (listing agency developed questions concerning nature and 
implementation of guidelines). 
 4. Id. 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1 (1992, rev. 
1997). 
 6. For recent merger cases brought by the Antitrust Division of the Justice 
Department, see United States v. George’s Foods, Case 5:11-cv-00043-gec (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(reviewing chicken processor acquisition of competing facility, which increased monopsony 
power without any allegation of increased power in the market for processed chickens); 
United States v. JBS Swift, No. l:08-cv-05992 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (challenging acquisition of 
National Beef, which was ultimately abandoned); United States v. Cargill, No. Civ.A. 
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in those cases reflects different metrics and standards for evaluating such 
mergers.  In addition, three major Court of Appeals decisions, including an 
FTC case, have highlighted the scope of buyer power, and its capacity to 
cause competitive harms at levels of concentration or involving a number 
of participants substantially at variance from the levels and numbers 
considered relevant to seller side power.
7
  In 2004, the prior administration 
deemed buyer power a sufficiently important topic that it included it in a 
workshop on merger enforcement.
8
 
Moreover, after the promulgation of the 1992 edition of the 
Guidelines, Roger Blair and Jeffrey Harrison published their book, 
Monopsony: Antitrust Law and Economics, in which they developed 
economic models reflecting the competitive analysis of buyer conduct and 
the implications of buyer mergers.
9
  In the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the academic literature in both law and economics has produced 
books and articles that further enrich the analysis of the implications of 
buyer-side mergers for competition including the potential impacts on 
innovation.
10
  Several empirical studies have shown that buyer power has a 
 
991875GK, 2000 WL 1475752 (D.D.C. June 30, 2000) (holding that acquisition of 
Continental Grain was subject to some divestiture); United States v. Aetna, No. 3-99 CV 
1398-H, 1999 WL 1419046 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999) (holding that acquisition of health care 
operations was allowed but subject to divestiture of some assets).   
  The FTC has claimed that it is attentive to buyer side issues.  However, its apparent 
failure to focus on those issues in grocery mergers suggests that it has not developed as 
much analytic capacity or interest as the DOJ.  See generally Letter from Donald S. Clark, 
Sec’y of FTC, to Albert A. Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute (Feb. 27, 2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/02/letterfoer.htm (discussing acquisition of Supermercados 
Amigo by Wal-Mart, specifically as it relates to the FTC’s decision to not to engage in 
rigorous monopsony review). 
 7. Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing dismissal of class action 
charging collusion among employers of technical workers to establish uniform job 
classifications and related pay grades); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 
979 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding conspiracy and monopoly claims under state antitrust law 
based on unlawful manipulation of the market for cheese causing lower prices for milk); 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding FTC finding of violation 
based on use of buyer power to coerce suppliers into boycotting competitors of major 
customer). 
 8. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, FTC/DOJ JOINT WORKSHOP ON MERGER 
ENFORCEMENT (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/index.shtm. 
 9. ROGER BLAIR & JEFFREY HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(1993).  They have recently published a somewhat revised and expanded version of their 
pioneer work, ROGER BLAIR & JEFFREY HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(2010). 
 10. See, e.g., Symposium, Buyer Power and Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 505 (2004); 
John Asker, A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 
724 (2010); Cory S. Capps, Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 
375 (2010); Zhiqi Chen, Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy, 22 RES. L. & 
ECON. 17 (2007); and Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and 
Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for Special Features of 
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significant effect on input prices.
11
 
Certainly, the revision process could have focused explicitly on those 
cases, and the continuing scholarship by asking how a new version of the 
Guidelines should elaborate on what an “analogous” framework is in 
practice.  Some individual comments submitted in the course of the process 
did focus on buyer power issues.
12
 
While no questions were asked to frame the topic, the agencies did 
include a separate section of the proposed Guidelines that elaborated, 
slightly, on the Delphic declaration in the 1992 Guidelines.  After further 
comment, that section, with only one modest but important clarification 
(shown in italics here) remained in the final Guidelines: 
12.  Mergers of Competing Buyers 
Mergers of competing buyers can enhance market power on 
the buying side of the market, just as mergers of competing 
sellers can enhance market power on the selling side of the 
market.  Buyer market power is sometimes called “monopsony 
power.” 
To evaluate whether a merger is likely to enhance market 
power on the buying side of the market, the Agencies employ 
essentially the framework described above for evaluating 
whether a merger is likely to enhance market power on the 
selling side of the market.  In defining relevant markets, the 
 
Auction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (2004). 
  Agricultural economists have been particularly attentive to these issues.  See ROGER 
CLARKE, ET AL., BUYER POWER AND COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN FOOD RETAILING (2002); 
Richard Sexton & Mingxia Zhang, An Assessment of the Impact of Food Industry Market 
Power on U.S. Consumers, 17 AGRIBUSINESS 59 (2001).  My own contributions to this 
discussion include participation in the Workshop referenced in note 8, supra, and two 
articles:  Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The 
Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271 (2008) 
[hereinafter Carstensen, Buyer Power], and Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels versus 
Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy, 1 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Carstensen, Buyer Cartels]. 
 11. Sugato Bhattacharyya & Amrita Nain, Horizontal Acquisitions and Buying Power: 
A Product Market Analysis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 97 (2011); C. Edward Fee & Shawn Thomas, 
Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival 
Firms, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 423, 424–27 (2004).  Other scholars have found substantial losses to 
sellers resulting from buyer cartels.  See John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Price Effects of Bidding 
Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction “Knockouts,” 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 503 
(1997) (finding a 32% price decrease resulted from bid-rigging in real estate auctions); Jon 
P. Nelson, Comparative Antitrust Damages in Bid-Rigging Cases: Some Findings from a 
Used Vehicle Auction, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 386, 392–94 (1993) (finding a significant 
price decrease resulted from bid-rigging in auctions for used police cars). 
 12. I was one of those who submitted such a comment.  See Peter C. Carstensen, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: The Omitted Dimension of Buyer Power Comments 
Submitted to the FTC and U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2010) (commenting on 1993 revisions to 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines). 
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Agencies focus on the alternatives available to sellers in the face 
of a decrease in the price paid by a hypothetical monopsonist. 
Market power on the buying side of the market is not a 
significant concern if suppliers have numerous attractive outlets 
for their goods or services.  However, when that is not the case, 
the Agencies may conclude that the merger of competing buyers 
is likely to lessen competition in a manner harmful to sellers. 
The Agencies distinguish between effects on sellers arising 
from a lessening of competition and effects arising in other ways.  
A merger that does not enhance market power on the buying side 
of the market can nevertheless lead to a reduction in prices paid 
by the merged firm, for example, by reducing transactions costs 
or allowing the merged firm to take advantage of volume-based 
discounts.  Reduction in prices paid by the merging firms not 
arising from the enhancement of market power can be significant 
in the evaluation of efficiencies from a merger, as discussed in 
Section 10. 
The Agencies do not view a short-run reduction in the 
quantity purchased as the only, or best, indicator of whether a 
merger enhances buyer market power.  Nor do the Agencies 
evaluate the competitive effects of mergers between competing 
buyers strictly, or even primarily, on the basis of effects in the 
downstream markets in which the merging firms sell. 
Example 24:  Merging Firms A and B are the only two buyers in the 
relevant geographic market for an agricultural product.  Their merger will 
enhance buyer power and depress the price paid to farmers for this 
product, causing a transfer of wealth from farmers to the merged firm and 
inefficiently reducing supply.  These effects can arise even if the merger 




This declaration is an important step forward.  It recognizes a couple 
of the major differences between the analysis of mergers that affect the 
buying side of the market and those traditionally used to evaluate seller-
side effects.  The key points are, first, the acknowledgment that even if 
there are no immediate effects on consumers, a merger can be unlawful 
solely based on its buyer-side effect (Example 24 makes this point).  
Second, the fact that output may remain unchanged is also not necessarily a 
basis to conclude that the merger has no adverse effect on competition.  
This declaration reflects an acceptance of the fact that “all or nothing” 
contracts that powerful buyers could impose in many circumstances would 
not eliminate illegality.  Finally, efficiency gains that might excuse a 
 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 32–33 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES] (emphasis added). 
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merger that has some adverse effect on competition do not include transfers 
of producer surplus resulting from enhanced buyer power. 
What is missing from the brief section, less than a page out of the 
thirty-four pages constituting the revised Guidelines, is the kind of 
thoughtful and nuanced exposition of policy and approaches that would 
elevate buyer-side merger analysis to a position of parallel importance with 
seller side analysis.  This article provides a fuller elaboration of the 
enforcement policy issues raised by mergers affecting the buying side of 
the market.  The central theme of the following discussion is that different 
metrics and different measures are essential to the analysis of buyer power 
and the effect of mergers on that power. 
I.  OVERVIEW 
Buyer power is a major source of competitive concern even though it 
has received relatively less consideration than seller power in the legal and 
economic analysis of competition policy.  Blair and Harrison start their 
new book with the observation that “monopsony is far more prevalent than 
many have recognized.”
14
  They then devote the next fourteen pages to 
summarizing what they call the recent examples of monopsony that include 
various kinds of bid rigging in auctions for things from antiques to treasury 
bonds, collusive practices involving financial aid to college students, salary 
setting for professional athletes, restrictions on college athletic scholarships 
and coaches, collusion to restrict competition for various kinds of 
technically skilled employees, and restraints in agricultural product 
markets.
15
  Historically, buyer power issues were at the root of some of the 
earliest antitrust cases and have remained a continuous, but under-
appreciated component of antitrust case law over the years.
16
  Hence, 
merger policy ought to take careful account of the ways in which mergers 
increase buyer power and have criteria for determining whether particular 
combinations create an undue risk of creating unnecessary and excessive 
buyer power. 
The following discussion identifies the competitive issues that 
mergers affecting the buyer side of the market present and then fits them 
into the mold of merger analysis as set forth in the Guidelines.  Part II 
presents the analysis of buyer power including a focus on the different 
incentives that buyers have as well as the ways in which they can—and 
do—use their power to exclude, exploit, and entrench their position as 
buyers and sometimes as sellers as well.  This part demonstrates that there 
is a broader and more complex set of potential competitive harms arising 
 
 14. BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 1. 
 15. Id. at 1–14. 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 30–40 (describing various cases involving buyer power issues). 
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This survey of potential adverse competitive effects provides the basis 
for Part III that organizes the information around the standard competitive 
effects analysis used in merger law.  Here too, the point of emphasis is that 
the competitive risks can and do arise from smaller market shares and 
larger numbers of market participants than seller side merger analysis now 
uses as its measure.  Hence, Part IV addresses directly the question of 
market share thresholds and the inferences of competitive harm that might 
arise from combinations that create buyer power in excess of those 
thresholds. 
Part V then takes up the problem of market definition to reinforce the 
position of the Guidelines that “the alternatives available to sellers” 
necessarily define both the product and geographic dimensions of the 
markets relevant to the analysis.  Finally, Part VI considers the role of 
various defenses in the context of mergers creating buyer power.  Of 
particular concern is the use of “efficiency” to describe wealth transfers 
from producers to buyers where there is no change in real productive 
efficiency. 
The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate that, while the new 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines are a significant step forward with respect to 
identifying the relevant analysis of mergers creating buyer power, they 
remain insufficient.  They do not acknowledge the ways in which buyer 
power differs in degree and sometimes kind from seller power.  Of greatest 
concern, they do not take account of the fact that buyer power can and does 
arise at lower levels of market concentration and can involve larger 
numbers of competitors than would raise concerns on the selling side of the 
market.  Further, buyer power can cause harms upstream from the 
immediately affected seller so that comprehensive analysis requires 
recognition of these more remote effects.  Finally, market definition needs 
to focus on seller options including the ease with which sellers can find 
substitute markets for their output.  The failure to develop more fully the 
analysis of mergers creating buyer power has pervasive adverse effects on 
the long run viability of our economy.  It is particularly important for 
agricultural commodity markets where buyer concentration has caused 
substantial harm to farmers and ranchers. 
Lastly, this analysis rests on a policy goal of maintaining and 
enhancing competition in markets.  While various economic measures of 
consumer, producer, and aggregate welfare are not irrelevant to that policy 
goal, as the analysis will show at various points, the objective of 
 
 17. It is arguable that more kinds of competitive harm arise from seller-side mergers 
than conventional analysis recognizes, but that is an issue for another day. 
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competition law is to protect competition both as a means to the end of 
long run dynamic efficiency and as an end in itself.
18
 
II.  BUYER POWER–DEFINED, COMPETITIVE IMPACTS, INCENTIVES OF 
THE POSSESSOR(S) 
The observable patterns in the reported cases as well as the empirical 
and theoretical work of economists who have evaluated the issues 
associated with buyer power suggest the following salient points about 
buyer power and its anticompetitive exploitation.  This part addresses the 
definition of buyer power, the incentives and disincentives to use buyer 
power in ways that adversely effect competition, and then provides a 
review of the potential adverse competitive affects that are central to an 
understanding and evaluation of mergers that create or expand buyer 
power.  Some of the attributes of buyer power identified here have close 
analogues on the selling side, but others are qualitatively or quantitatively 
quite different.  Ultimately, both buyers and sellers seek to increase and 
protect over time their profits, which in turn means that there will be a 
substantial correlation between the uses of buyer and seller power. 
A.  Buyer Power Defined 
Any buyer that is not a pure price taker has some buyer power.  Even 
an individual customer at an auto dealership can have some power as she 
negotiates a lower price.  The power of the buyer comes from the central 
economic fact that the buyer is usually the “decider” with respect to 
whether to purchase from any particular vendor.  In face-to-face 
transactions, the buyer decides not only whether to buy but also from 
whom to make the purchase.  The resulting discretion is central to the 
potential for a buyer to have substantial bargaining power.  The potential 
seller is put in the position of accepting the offer or waiting for another 
buyer to come along.  The basic paradigm is that the seller seeks buyers 
and buyers make the key decisions.  The seller does have the option to 
refuse to make a sale on the terms the buyer proposes.  This gives the seller 
bargaining power in situations were buyers have relatively few options.  
When, however, there are costs to the seller from delay and uncertainty, the 
buyer has increased leverage.  Thus, the sequence of decisional power 
differentiates the buyer from the seller and is a major explanation for why 
buyers in many contexts can have significant power even if they do not 
 
 18. See FREDERICK M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 18 (3d ed. 1990) (noting that “the political arguments . . . and not 
the economists’ abstruse models, have tipped the balance of social consensus toward 
competition”). 
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dominate the buying side of the market in ways comparable to those 
associated with seller power.
19
  Indeed, this decisional model proceeds 
directly from the observation that buyer power occurs in market contexts in 
which the market share of the buyer or buyers is well below that which 
would be likely to support seller exploitation.
20
 
Closely related to the decisional role of the buyer is the fact that it is 
more difficult for a seller to engage in arbitrage in the ways that a buyer 
can.  This facilitates the ability of buyers to engage in price discrimination 
among sellers.  In the standard seller side context, in contrast, the favored 
buyer’s ability to resell the product to the disfavored buyer constrains the 
seller’s ability to impose different prices or other conditions on buyers.  But 
in the case of buyer power, the capacity of a favored seller to obtain the 
necessary input from a disfavored seller and deliver it to the buyer is 
usually constrained.  This is most clearly the case whenever the buyer can 
insist that the seller produce or provide the input.
21
  The buyer has the 
capacity to ensure that its disfavored suppliers cannot substitute sales to a 
favored supplier for delivery to the buyer. 
But the ability to discriminate among sellers is also central to making 
the marginal cost of the input approximate its marginal contribution to the 
productive process.  In contrast, if a buyer is obliged (e.g., by a labor 
contract or custom) to pay the same price to all input suppliers, then to raise 
the price at the margin to increase input supply results in a cost increase 
reflecting the total input purchases.
22
  As a result, the cost of increasing 
supply is much greater than the increased output resulting from the 
marginal addition.  This insight is a common place in labor economics
23
 
and is observed in other contexts where the buyer has committed to paying 




 19. Indeed, implicit in the usual assumption that a seller must have a large market share 
in order to have power is the recognition that buyers make the decision to buy and can 
switch to other sources if they exist and are reasonable alternatives. 
 20. See infra Part V (discussing how buyer power can occur in situations where a 
purchaser has a relatively low market share). 
 21. The most obvious case is labor.  The employee cannot substitute another worker.  
But the same is true in many selling contexts. 
 22. Such price uniformity extending to existing input suppliers is a “most favored 
nation” “restraint” on the freedom of the buyer that incentivizes the buyer to depress price. 
 23. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 133–41 
(10th ed. 2009). 
 24. For a monopsonist, paying a uniform price to increase the number of suppliers 
requires increasing payments to all suppliers.  The following illustrative hypothetical is 
drawn from Cory Capps, Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & 
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Uniform pricing, therefore, creates its own incentives to employ buyer 
power either unilaterally or collectively to hold the marginal price steady or 
even force it down. 
The remaining issue to consider is the strength of buyer power itself.  
In general it should be obvious as the prior paragraph points out that the 
options for sellers will greatly affect the capacity of a buyer to exercise 
power.  Blair and Harrison have developed a measure of buyer power that 
focuses on price elasticity of supply and demand.  Their central insight is 
that when supply elasticity is low and the marginal buyers have little 
capacity to expand purchases, the buyer has much more leverage because it 
can reduce price, even without imposing an “all or nothing” contract and 
obtain substantial supplies.  Another factor increasing power comes from 
increased switching costs.  The more sunk investment a supplier has, the 
more difficult it is to move into another line of production.
25
  Thus, buyer 
power problems are particularly evident in poultry, livestock and dairy 
production because of the substantial, specialized investments by 
producers.  Doctors and hospitals are in a somewhat similar situation 
having large specialized investments such that they are vulnerable to buyer 
pressure.
26
  Related to these investments may be informational issues.  If 
producers lack good information about and access to alternative outlets for 
their production, they are less able to resist buyer demands.  The seller 








Total Cost Increase in 
Cost 
$100 500 1,000 $50,000,000 - 
$102 501 1,000 $51,102,000 $1,102,000 
Thus, in order to add one doctor by offering a 2% increase in compensation, which would 
add one thousand additional patient visits, the health care provider would encounter a 
$1,102,000 increase in its costs.  Unless it could collect that much in charges for the 
incremental one thousand patient visits, it would lose money by increasing output.  The 
marginal doctor, herself, adds only $102,000 to the costs of the provider.  The remainder of 
the increase is compensation to doctors who would have provided the same service for $2 
less per visit. 
  Another example is in livestock purchases where the buyer pays contract suppliers 
based on the transactional market price as reported during or at the end of the day.  In such a 
circumstance, the buyer has a strong disincentive to bid up the price of the cattle or hogs in 
the “cash” market because of the impact on the substantial volume of contract livestock. 
 25. BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 53–61. 
 26. See, e.g., W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 85 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(finding that plaintiff plausibly alleged that the dominant regional hospital chain engaged in 
anticompetetive conduct by conspiring with an insurer to reduce competition); Complaint, 
United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 2010 WL 4108490, at §I.1 (alleging that 
leading insurer’s “most favored pricing” agreements with hospitals forced hospitals to raise 
the prices they charged to competing insurance companies); see also, Marius Schwartz, 
Address at the 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern University School of 
Law: Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger 1 (Oct. 20, 1999) (describing 
how concerns about monopsony guide federal antitrust enforcement). 
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few options altogether, it may find itself subject to greater exploitation 
from its current customer because of the uncertainty about the output of a 
switch.
27
  The costs of switching are increased when the current buyer takes 
all or most of the supplier’s output.  Then the switch does not involve a 
marginal shift in sales, but a massive change.  The risks and costs of such a 
change are great. 
A closely related source of power occurs when the seller needs access 
to a large number of buyers who resell the product, i.e., retail outlets.  In 
such a situation, one buyer is not a good substitute for another.  The 
supplier needs a large number of retail outlets in order to operate at an 
efficient scale.  Hence, the loss of any major customer is a significant event 
because it is hard to replace one customer with another.  A recurrent 
observation is that high volume retailers have significant leverage over 
their suppliers.
28
  Because of the need to have access to a large percentage 
of outlets in order to obtain a sufficient volume of sales, producers are put 
at the mercy of each of their large volume customers.
29
  In such a context, a 
retail firm with a 20% or 15% share of the national market in such a class 
of products is likely to have substantial power over its suppliers because of 
the threat that the supplier could lose one-sixth or one-fifth or more of its 
outlets.  Reducing the number of outlets stocking a product line to 85% or 
less of prior outlets can create a serious problem for a supplier.  The central 
insight here is that for mass marketers to operate efficiently they need to 
have a very large-scale presence in geographically dispersed retail outlets.  
Moreover, replacing lost retail outlets in not easy if other outlets either 
 
 27. See Jeremy Sandford, Competition and Endogenous Impatience In Credence Good 
Markets 5 (University of Kentucky, Working Paper, 2011) (showing that in an uncertain 
world with asymmetric information, customers will face serious problems if they have fewer 
than five choices among suppliers on the assumption that the buyer can not return to prior 
supplier and so face increasing risks as the number declines). 
 28. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that even large 
toy manufacturers could not find a viable alternative to selling through Toys “R” Us, which 
controlled 20% of toy sales in the U.S.).  Additional support comes from Europe.  See 
CLARKE, supra note 10 (arguing that large European supermarket chains use their buyer 
power to impose unfair contractual terms on suppliers); see also, CHARLES FISHMAN, THE 
WAL-MART EFFECT (2006) (describing Walmart’s dominance of the U.S. retail sector); 
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INT’L UNION, ENDING WALMART’S RURAL 
STRANGLEHOLD 1 (2010) (arguing that Walmart forced concentration among suppliers, 
violating federal antitrust laws). 
 29. See JOSEPH CORNWALL PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 107–58 
(1955) (noting that one potential reason why the automobile industry has so long insisted on 
using many independent dealers rather than chains of retailers is their fear of the potential 
power chains would acquire to dictate to the manufacturer).  Palamountain also suggests a 
similar explanation for the historical experience of the gasoline industry, which initially 
tried ownership integration into retailing but then moved to individually-owned gas stations 
over which the producers still sought to exercise substantial control.  Id. 
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have the product lines they want or already carry the manufacturer’s line.  
The central point is that outlets are cumulative and not substitutes. 
Producers of consumer goods can, by advertising, create consumer 
demand directly for their products.  Such “must carry” goods (e.g., Gerber 
baby food) have more insulation from buyer power, but even here the 
retailer has substantial discretion to decide on the amount and location of 




Small producers of consumer good are, in some respects, even worse 
off.  They may require only a regional presence, but they are likely to be 
more dependent on the retailers that are willing to give them an outlet.  The 
threat by a major retailer (relative to the total volume produced by the 
upstream supplier) to drop or curtail its selling effort creates a serious 
economic problem for the manufacturer.  Unless it can switch products or 
outlets easily, such a producer faces a bargaining situation in which the 
downstream retailer has the dominant position.  The use of slotting 
allowances, advertising support, and other payments by producers to 
retailers confirm the relative power. 
The common theme of the cases is that when an upstream producer 
needs to sell in volume
31
 and so needs access to a large number of outlets 
for its product, this empowers the downstream volume retailer to make 
demands both about price and non-price exclusionary conditions.  The 
exclusionary conduct, such as the refusals to deal sought in Toys “R” Us, 
can be unilateral agreements with upstream producers.
32
  Retailer demands 
can also require coordination among producers as in Klor’s or Interstate 
Circuit.
33
  Such coordination is more likely than outright horizontal price 
fixing or market allocation among such firms; each participating upstream 
firm has a strong incentive to adhere to the scheme because its own sales 




 30. See Gregory T. Gundlach et al, Special Issue, The Implications of the Work of 
Robert L. Steiner, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 821–974 (2004) (discussing Robert Steiner’s work 
on the dual role of retailers as both distributors of others companies’ products and as 
competitors through house brands). 
 31. Volume needs stem from economies of scale as well as from the efficient operating 
scale needed for a particular production facility.  Once a firm has a facility that produces at a 
particular level, it often needs to maintain sales at that level because of the diseconomies 
that come from cutting back on output in a plant designed to produce at a substantially 
larger level. 
 32. 221 F.3d. at 934. 
 33. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959); Interstate 
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 217 (1939). 
 34. See generally Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, Three Types of Collusion: 
Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941 (2000) (discussing incidences of 
collusion where one firm exerted pricing pressure to induce another firm to independently 
make a decision that restricted competition). 
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Despite the Robinson-Patman Act,
35
 some of the power of large 
retailers is used to obtain better price terms on the goods being purchased.  
Thus, the large retailer gets, directly or indirectly, lower prices than other 
retailers even though there is no economic justification for this difference.  
Law enforcers should be skeptical of the social advantage that may accrue 
from such selective discounts.  When not cost justified, they serve 
primarily to disadvantage classes of buyers who lack power and thus 
indirectly reinforce the market power of the dominant buyer.
36
 
More generally, one observes as the justification for mergers in 
retailing that the combined firm will achieve lower prices.  Whenever the 
expected lower prices are to arise from lower input prices, there are 
grounds for concern that what is about to occur is a kind of ratcheting 
effect wherein the retailer forces an intermediary to lower its price and that 
lower price is reflected back up the chain until it comes to rest with those 
lacking power to pass on the reduced price.  To be sure, there are 
alternative explanations for such cost savings on the input side.  There may 
well be economies of scale or scope as well as transaction cost savings that 
are substantial.  Careful examination of the claims of the merging parties 
will reveal how the gains are likely to occur. 
This phenomenon, which this discussion has located in the retailing 
end of the distribution chain, may also exist in other contexts where either 
buyers or sellers require access to the capacity of a substantial fraction of 
those on the other side of the transaction.
37
  What is important from the 
perspective of merger analysis is that when such a need for use or access 
exists, as concentration increases beyond a very competitive structure, the 
opportunity to exercise such power will arise.  Again, the paradigm is Toys 
“R” Us, which had a 20% share of the toy market.
38
 
Professor Kirkwood argues that buyer power involves two distinct 
categories of power:  monopsony, which involves exploitation of 
producers, and “countervailing power” which powerful buyers use to offset 
the market power of oligopoly producers.
39
  This is not a helpful 
distinction, although it mirrors in part the claims of retailers that they need 
 
 35. 15 U.S.C § 13 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale of commodities 
identical in grade and quality when sold for resale). 
 36. See infra Part II.C.1 (describing the waterbed effect). 
 37. In electric power, the peak load phenomenon creates a similar potential under some 
pricing schemes.  The owner of base capacity has an incentive to acquire and withhold mid-
level power production so that peak prices increase by requiring the market to call on even 
more expensive generation, resulting in an increased profit for the base component of the 
company’s system.  This strategic conduct is rational because the market is taking the entire 
industry output as a unit and pricing all units at a single price. 
 38. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 39. John Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Merger Policy 4 (Seattle University School of 
Law, Working Paper, 2011). 
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to combine in order to demand lower prices.  Notably, producers of 
consumer goods respond by justifying their mergers as necessary to 
respond to the buyer power of the retailers.  Increased concentration at the 
manufacturing-retailing intersection has the dual effect of creating more 
upstream buyer power in the manufacturers even as they face increased 
buyer power from retailers.  The retailers in turn have increased retailing 
power as the number of competitors decline in the selling market.  The end 
result of this process is that both further upstream producers and final 
consumers confront increased market power.
40
  Moreover, the retailers and 
their immediate suppliers have a shared interest in the joint exploitation of 
this power. 
At the same time, achieving some scale in buying capacity can be 
important to achieving the ability to bargain effectively over price and 
quality.  The Topco case, for example, included evidence that for a grocery 
chain to obtain house brands required a minimum of $250 million in total 
retail sales; hence a joint venture was essential to the Topco parties to have 
the necessary scale to obtain these products.
41
  Thus, it is important to 
recognize that some level of buyer consolidation, whether by merger or 
joint venture, can be helpful in creating the scale necessary for efficient 
buying.  This, however, does not require that there be any bifurcation of the 
buyer power itself into distinct categories. 
B.  Incentives and Barriers to Exploiting Buyer Power 
In evaluating the risk of anticompetitive consequences from a merger 
that increases market power on either the buying or selling side, it is 
important to consider the incentives of the merged firm to engage in such 
conduct, as well as the potential market forces that might deter such 
conduct.  In selling markets, there is a rational basis to be skeptical about 
the gain to the seller from trying to raise price either through coordination 
or unilaterally because competitors could undercut that price.  Hence, it is 
often said that there needs to be an alignment of interests and incentives for 
an oligopoly to engage in coordinated market exploitation and that 
unilateral efforts similarly require concern for both the barriers to new 
entry and to the potential for existing competitors to respond. 
 
 40. See Sexton & Zhang, supra note 10, at 59 (noting how the effects of combined 
upstream and downstream power result in serious allocative inefficiency). 
 41. See United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 613–14 n.1 (1968) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing the trial record).  But Topco, whose members had $2.2 billion in sales, 
was five to ten times larger than necessary to achieve those economies, suggesting that it 
may have served other goals as well.  See Harry First & Peter Carstensen, Rambling 
Through Economic Theory: Topco’s Closer Look, in ANTITRUST STORIES 11 (Dan Crane, 
Eleanor Fox, eds., 2007) (discussing the possibility that Topco also facilitated naked market 
allocation among its members). 
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While in general the same considerations are relevant on the buying 
side, there are important differences with respect to incentives and 
opportunities.  Exploiting buyer power results in lower input costs.  This 
serves the interest of the firm in increasing profits regardless of its position 
in the downstream markets in which it sells its products.  In addition, a 
buyer can deploy its power to cause its suppliers to refuse to deal with its 
competitors in either the input or output markets.
42
  Finally, a buyer in most 
contexts exercises discretion with respect to the identity of its supplier.  
This provides a further opportunity to affect upstream competition among 
suppliers.  The implications for competition of these incentives are 
discussed in the next sub-section.  What is important for present purposes is 
that there is a range of opportunities to exploit buyer power provided that 
the exploitation does not create undue risks of competitive responses that 
affect the firm. 
Moreover, the incentives to exploit these opportunities are greater than 
those with respect to exploiting seller power because the potential deterrent 
effect of competitors is, in many circumstances, less likely to impose a 
significant constraint on powerful buyer(s).  All buyers in any market have 
a shared interest in keeping prices for inputs down.  Of course, like the 
selling side, if the demand for the input exceeds supply at a current price 
and supply is price elastic, then buyers generally have an incentive to raise 
prices. 
However, unlike a price cut on the selling side that seeks an 
immediate increase in sales, paying more for an input has no direct effect 
on the quantity of goods sold.  By way of illustration, assume a buyers’ 
cartel has depressed the price of an input.  A buyer wishing to compete 
with the cartel for that input must raise its price to the sellers.  This raises 
the buyer’s costs of production and so makes its downstream products more 
costly.
43
  Such “cheating” by raising prices may also induce a larger input 
supply.  Increased input purchases do not immediately increase either sales 
or profits of the cheater.  The fact of an inherent lag allows for retaliation 
by the cartel against the cheating member by, for example, bidding up 
further the price of the input.  This is most effective in markets where sales 
are made directly and not through public markets because the buyers can 
then employ selective bidding to drive up the costs of the deviant.
44
  Thus, 
 
 42. See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 207 (1959) 
(finding in favor of a retailer who claimed that manufacturers had boycotted it in favor of a 
competing retailer); Toys “R” Us, 221 F.3d at 928 (finding retailer Toys “R” Us liable for 
coordinating an agreement among manufacturers not to deal its competitors). 
 43. If the downstream market is workably competitive, the seller will have a lower 
margin for its product and will be unable to raise its prices.  In fact, by increasing its output, 
the only likely effect is to cause a reduction in price. 
 44. If the cartel can identify the specific suppliers to the deviant, it can bid up prices to 
those suppliers.  The deviant must answer those prices if it wants to continue its supply.  
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buying markets are different in kind from selling markets because the buyer 
makes no direct profit from the purchase of inputs.  They are necessary, but 
lagged components in the profit making products that result. 
When the downstream market is also oligopolistic, there is a further 
incentive to keep prices of inputs down because this will increase the 
margins between input and output prices as well as potentially limit the 
supply of inputs available at the prevailing, depressed input market price.  
Reduced input availability in turn provides each oligopolist with increased 
opportunity to raise price in the downstream market with the knowledge 
that its competitors are unlikely to bid up input prices (lowering their 
margins) in order to reduce resale prices (still further lowering the total 
margin).
45
  Thus, there is both a general incentive to create and exploit 
buyer power and less capacity for any self-correction of such market 
distortions.  This models works most obviously when the overall supply 
curve is upward sloping (i.e., higher prices are necessary to call forth 
increased production) but even if the supply curve is flat or even downward 
sloping, where there is information asymmetry, lower prices might 




An important analogy is to the work on auctions that shows that 
bidder collusion is a substantial risk because of the strong incentives to 
participate in such conspiracies and exploit sellers.
47
  Moreover, auction 
cartels are rational despite revolving membership exactly because of the 
mutual advantages of such conduct.
48
  Further, potential bidders in an open 
auction do not have the same capacity to disrupt such cartels as occurs on 
the selling side of the market.
49
  All of this follows because the object of 
collusion is the bid price and not the price at which competitors will sell 
their products.  These observations apply to many buying market contexts.  
This difference in the incentives of buyers from sellers as well as the 
 
Otherwise, it abandons those suppliers, only to find its new suppliers have similar 
opportunities.  Since the cartel does not have to share the higher prices with other suppliers, 
it can focus on “raising its rivals’ costs” without undue risk of disrupting the prices of the 
bulk of its supplies.  This strategy is analogous to involuntary base-point pricing used to 
discipline deviants from price-fixing cartels.  See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) 
(sustaining an order by the FTC to prevent cement manufacturers from agreeing to price 
their goods on a basing point price system). 
 45. See, e.g., Sexton & Zhang, supra note 10 (observing this phenomenon in the context 
of powerful buyers of farm products). 
 46. The case of declining product costs, however, does generally result in weakening 
buying power and would counsel against significant concerns unless, as postulated above, 
there are significant information asymmetries or other market failures. 
 47. Marshall & Meurer, supra note 10 at 85–86. 
 48. See generally Asker, supra note 10 (stamp buyers’ cartel was durable despite 
changing membership). 
 49. Marshall & Meurer, supra note 10 at 92. 
CARSTENSEN_FINALIZEDFOUR (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:29 AM 
792 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
indirect impact of buying on the ultimate profit of the business has two 
implications for merger analysis.  First, coordinated efforts to keep input 
prices down can encompass more potential participants without serious risk 
of opportunistic defection.  The Second Circuit remarked on this fact when 
it upheld a complaint charging a number of major employers in the oil and 
gas industry of conspiring to suppress wage competition among potential 
employees.
50
  Moreover, such efforts at price limitations would require very 
little coordination among buyers because the retention of low input prices 
is obviously in the self-interest of each buyer.
51
  Indeed, there is evidence 
that buyers can re-create tacit collusion after a period of disruption and that 
this can be done on a recurring basis.
52
  This demonstrates the potential 
strength of the “tit-for-tat” strategy found to be the long-run best strategy in 
the prisoners’ dilemma game.
53
 
Second, even in the absence of overt or even tacit coordination, a 
buyer with some monopsony or oligopsony power will have an obvious 
incentive to drive down input prices and increase the price spread between 
input and output markets.  Moreover, its competitors in the downstream 
markets will have little incentive to disrupt such unilateral conduct in many 
situations.  To be sure, raising rivals’ costs (i.e., entering the rival’s 
upstream market and raising the price of the input) is a plausible strategy, 
but the costs of bidding up a competitor’s input prices must be balanced 
against the potential for retaliation and the mutual harm, relative to other 
producers, in terms of costs for the products being sold.
54
 
Indeed, as discussed below, a better strategy, arguably unilateral, is to 
allocate input markets so that each major firm has its own set of suppliers 
as to which it can exercise buyer power.  This strategy reduces input prices 
and avoids the kinds of competitive confrontations that could otherwise 
 
 50. Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 51. The settlements with various Silicon Valley high tech firms that terminated a series 
of agreements not to raid each other’s employees by cold calling is illustrative of the kind of 
loose cartel arrangements that are possible.  See, e.g., Final Judgment, United States v. 
Adobe, Case No.1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. 2010) (prohibiting Google, Apple, Adobe, Intel, 
Inuit and Pixar from agreeing not to compete for employees). 
 52. Xiaowei Cai, Kyle W. Stiegert, & Stephen Koontz, Regime Switching and 
Oligopsony Power: The Case of U.S. Beef Processing, 42 AG. ECON. 99 (2011). 
 53. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (providing the 
foundation of the influence of cooperation on game theory).  For an analysis of the 
relevance of this work to antitrust, see Peter C. Carstensen, While Antitrust Was Out to 
Lunch: Lessons from the 1980s for the Next Century of Enforcement, 48 SMU L. REV. 1881 
(1995). 
 54. The logic arguing against such conduct explains, in part, the Supreme Court’s 
skeptical and restrictive standard for finding predatory buying.  See e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. 
v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Co., 549 U.S. 312, 323–26 (2007) (explaining the similarities 
of predatory pricing and predatory bidding, noting the extreme difficulties of successfully 
executing such a scheme, and requiring a plaintiff to meet a substantial two-prong test to 
prevail under either theory). 
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occur if a rival wanted to compete for the same sources of inputs.  It is a 
better long-term strategy for a buyer to have its own set of semi-captive 
suppliers than to be in a market where it must compete with other buyers.  
The incentive to pursue such a strategy is particularly strong when the cost 
of shipping the input, e.g., livestock, is significant, and many areas of the 
country are amenable to the production of the input.  Furthermore, new 
entrants would in general find it more attractive to enter into markets where 
no buyer currently operates.  While this requires the creation of new input 
suppliers, the entrant then has its own quasi-captive suppliers and does not 
risk a competitive confrontation with an established buyer.  The end result 
of such confrontation is, after all, likely to be higher input prices and lower 
profit margins. 
The incentives for buyers to disrupt an understanding that depresses 
prices or for a new entrant to challenge an existing buyer exploiting buyer 
power are limited, but in some circumstances the ability to exploit even a 
large position in some specific segment of the buying market is unlikely.  
For example, a dominant buyer will have little power if the input has 
multiple uses and shipping costs are low.  Similarly, if supply is price 
elastic because producers can either increase or decrease output quickly or 
easily enter and exit the market, even a dominant buyer is unlikely to have 
significant power over such suppliers.  This may be the case in some 
generic manufactured inputs.  On the other hand, if longer term relational 
contracting is important, producers make significant sunk investment in 
relatively specialized equipment, or transportation is a significant cost 
factor and buyers are themselves geographically dispersed, then 




Two central observations come from the foregoing analysis of 
incentives and barriers to using buyer power.  First, buyers have strong 
incentives to exploit their power whenever possible.  Second, the 
constraints that limit, in many circumstances, the capacity of sellers to use 
their potential power are not nearly as powerful or pervasive on the buying 
side. 
C.  The Possible Anticompetitive Uses of Buyer Power 
There are a variety of ways that buyer power can be used to cause 
anticompetitive consequences for the market.  Those will be discussed 
below.  It merits acknowledgment, however, that the use of buyer power is 
not necessarily anticompetitive.  The ability to discriminate in prices paid 
 
 55. Richard Rogers & Richard Sexton, Assessing the Importance of Oligopsony Power 
in Agricultural Markets, 76 AMER. J. AG. ECON. 1143 (1994). 
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for inputs over time or even at the same time, means that such a buyer more 
closely relates input cost to output prices.
56
  This can increase demand for 
the input since only the marginal input is paid the higher (or lower) 
marginal price.  Second, given that in the real world price is only an 
approximation of cost, the capacity of a buyer to bargain in face-to-face 
transactions can move price closer to the seller’s costs and so make the 
entire market process work more efficiently.
57
  The fact that buyer power 
can facilitate markets as well as frustrate them will have a good deal of 
significance for any ultimate standard for judging the merits of mergers that 
create or increase buyer power. 
1. Direct Price Fixing 
Because of the incentives to exploit buyer power and limits on 
disincentives, firms with buyer power are likely to exploit that power 
without significant concern for immediate market reaction.  The most basic 
way such power can be exploited, as implicitly assumed in the preceding 
discussion, is to lower prices for inputs.  The conspiracies among blueberry 
buyers and tobacco buyers to hold down the prices paid for those crops are 
examples.
58
  Buyer cartels have existed in various employment markets.  
Several cases involving employees of high-tech companies, nurses, and 
doctors illustrate this
59
 as does the alleged conspiracy among oil and gas 
producers to limit wages for their technical employees.
60
 
Unilateral conduct can also produce lower input prices.  A well-known 
example is Walmart, which has a long-standing history of compelling its 
suppliers to give it lower and lower prices.
61
  The end result is that a 
 
 56. For further elaboration on this topic, see Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra note 10. 
 57. This is the strength of Kirkwood’s argument.  See Kirkwood, supra note 39 for a 
category of countervailing power. 
 58. See Deloach v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 1:00CV01235, 2003 WL 23094907 
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003) (determining whether attorney’s fees were reasonable in a 
tobacco buyer price fixing conspiracy that settled for $200 million); Nathan Assocs., 
Blueberries Price Fixing Class Action Finally Ends, 2 PROCEEDINGS: LITIGATION, 
REGULATORY, & OTHER NEWS 1 (May 13, 2005) (discussing a Maine state court case in 
which blueberry buyers were found to have engaged in a buyers cartel). 
 59. See, e.g., Final Judgment, United States v. Adobe, Case No.1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. 
2010) (involving antitrust issues in high-tech industry); United States v. Arizona Hosp. and 
Healthcare Ass’n, No. CV07-1030-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. 2007) (involving antitrust issues in 
healthcare industry). 
 60. See Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing an alleged conspiracy 
among fourteen integrated oil and petrochemical companies to set salaries at artificially low 
levels for technical employees). 
 61. See Timothy Richards & Geoffrey Pofahl, Pricing Power by Supermarket Retailers:  
A Ghost in the Machine?, 25(2) CHOICES: THE MAGAZINE OF FOOD, FARM, AND RESOURCE 
ISSUES (2010). 
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number of these suppliers were forced into bankruptcy.
62
  Walmart’s 
response was to move to another supplier.
63
  Its strategy, like other large 
buyers, is to become a leading customer of the supplier.  This creates 
leverage to demand lower prices.  More generally, empirical research has 
found that after horizontal mergers, the greatest impact is on the cost of 
inputs rather than the price of outputs.
64
 
In the standard economic models of monopsony the effect of lower 
prices is to reduce output even if supply is price inelastic.  This assumes 
that there is an upward sloping cost curve for the producer.  But, given 
those standard assumptions, a powerful buyer can use an “all or nothing” 
buying strategy to demand that the supplier provide the quantity that it 
would have provided at a competitive (i.e., higher) price if it wants to make 
any sale at all.  This is also essentially the result of labor contracts as 
individual sellers have only their labor to sell.  The price ought to 
approximate the average cost of producing the set quantity of goods.  Given 
an increasing marginal cost, this means that the seller loses money on some 
part of the order but that loss is offset by the lower costs of the infra-
marginal production.  In substance, the buyer has appropriated the 
efficiency gains that would otherwise accrue to the producer and left it in a 
breakeven position. 
To many economists focused on the short term, it may, nevertheless, 
appear that there is no adverse effect on allocative efficiency since output 
remains constant and the buyer has a lower cost for the input.  On this 
view, control over the surplus only as transferred, but that is not regarded 
as affecting the short-run optimal production and distribution of society’s 
goods and services. 
However, from another perspective, the result is inefficient because 
the cost of the marginal unit exceeds the price paid for it.  Moreover, the 
producer surplus transferred to the buyer reflects the extent to which the 
specific producer has achieved lower costs of production than the market 
price.   Thus, this part of the surplus, sometimes called Ricardian Rents, is 
the reward for efficient production.  Subsequent discussion will consider 
the competitive policy implications of the use of all-or-nothing contracts.  
For present purposes it suffices to note that such a contract can occur only 
if the buyer or buyers have some power over the seller because otherwise 
the seller would offer a smaller output at the price offered. 
Finally, one other consequence of imposing a price below the 
producer’s average cost on a producer selling to multiple buyers is that the 
 
 62. Barry C. Lynn, Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case Against Wal-Mart, 
HARPER’S BAZAAR 29, July 1, 2006. 
 63. ROBERT. A. SCHULTZ, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ETHICS AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 80 (2006). 
 64. See generally Fee & Thomas, supra note 11. 
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seller may be compelled to raise its prices to its other customers.  This is 
the waterbed effect.
65
  This will happen when the large buyer drives down 
the price to the seller below its average total cost for its overall production.  
Now it must recover, at least, that amount of money.  Assuming a 
somewhat differentiated product, the seller can raise its price to its other 
customers in order to recover its losses.  This is a sub-optimal result, we 
may assume, because otherwise those prices would have been higher 
already.  But if at least short-run demand is relatively inelastic, it would be 
feasible to extract additional income from the other buyers, even if the 
longer run implications are negative in terms of lost sale or buyer failure.  
If those customers, in turn, compete with the favored buyer, they will be at 
a further cost disadvantage.  Moreover, the favored buyer will have 




2. Manipulation of Public Market Prices 
As a firm becomes a larger buyer in any specific product line for 
which there is a public market or a publicly reported price, it has an 
increased incentive to engage in manipulation of that price.  This is true 
both when the majority of purchases are made in the public market and, 
even more, when the bulk of purchases are made outside the public market 
using the public price as a basis for the private transactional price.  By 
manipulating the price downward the buyer gains the advantage of lower 
input costs.  Of course, in public markets where most of the relevant 
commodity is traded, there are offsetting interests in upward manipulation.  
Hence, when the parties on both sides of such a market are substantial, 
there may well be a shared interest in neutrality.  This interest is greater as 
the number of parties that may trade on both sides, i.e., as the number of 
both buyers and sellers, increases.  Thus, market price manipulation is most 
likely to create problems when there are a few substantial traders 
consistently on one side of the transaction with a dispersed set of traders on 
the other side, and the market is a forum that sets a base price for a large 
number of off-exchange transactions. 
For example, the prices for many agricultural commodities, when sold 
 
 65. See generally Paul W. Dobson & Roman Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where 
Buying and Selling Power Come Together, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 331 (2008). 
 66. There is an illustrative historical case study of this process.  Standard Oil used its 
power as a buyer of rail services to require the railroads both to give it discounts and to pay 
it a percentage of the freight charges levied on its competitors.  Thus, it both raised its 
rivals’ costs and got a piece of the overcharge.  See Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, 
Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1996) (stating that Standard Oil collected a rebate from the railroads based on the quantity 
of oil shipped by its rivals). 
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under contract, rely on prices set in the residual public trading market.  
Thus, most hog contracts throughout the country use the prices from the 
northern Iowa–southern Minnesota market as the base for setting prices.  
Cheese and other dairy products rely on the prices from the Mercantile 
Exchange in Chicago for their base.
67
  Buyers (or sellers) of large quantities 
of such commodities have strong incentives to try to manipulate the 
“public” price in order to gain advantage in the great volume of goods that 
are traded off exchange.  Such manipulative use of public market prices is 
an old story.
68
  The cheese litigation is an example of this problem.
69
 
A crucial question is how much of a market share makes it worthwhile 
for a buyer to seek to influence the public market price?  How easy is it for 
buyers to coordinate their actions given the public character of such 
markets which may both facilitate transparency among the actors, but may 
also subject their actions to greater scrutiny?  The incentive to manipulate 
market prices increases with the size of the buyer.  Certainly, where the 
input is sold in a public market that handles only a small fraction of the 
overall sales but which is the source of prices for large numbers of off-
exchange transactions, it should be incumbent upon those reviewing a 
merger that will change appreciably the market shares of such a buyer to 
evaluate carefully this risk. 
Another related strategy involves forward contracts with an open price 
where the price is established at the time of delivery.  Here, the incentive is 
to limit the delivery base price to ensure that the contract prices are kept 
lower.  This is also why employers try to coordinate on wages.  If the wage 
at the margin increases, then all wages will go up in many employment 
situations.  The result is the employer faces a substantial increase in costs 
in order to achieve a marginal gain in production by adding the marginal 
employee.  In commodities, this strategy results in lower cash market prices 
because of the effect on the contract supply for which the cash market sets 
the base price. 
 
 67. The public market price of such dairy products indirectly determines the price of 
milk used for such manufacturing purposes as well as affecting the price for fluid milk. 
 68. See Peter Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago 
Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade 
Analysis, 15 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 42–43 (1992) (discussing early market manipulation cases). 
 69. The basic analysis of this manipulation is found in Willard F. Mueller et al., Cheese 
Pricing: A Study of the National Cheese Exchange, DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON., UNIV. OF WIS.-
MADISON (March 1996).  For reported cases see Kraft Foods, 232 F.3d at 979 (upholding a 
lawsuit by dairy farmers under California indirect purchaser law challenging market 
manipulation as antitrust violation) and Servais v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 631 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2001), aff’d 643 N.W.2d 92 (Wis. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1047 (2002) 
(rejecting a state antitrust challenge to this same conduct based on state law filed rate 
doctrine). 
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3. Discrimination Among Sellers70 
Another risk that a merger among competing input buyers creates is 
for direct price discrimination among sellers or other non-price 
exploitation.  A monopsonist, like a monopolist, has a great deal of 
discretion with whom it will deal and on what terms.  As discussed later, 
however, monopsony arises at lower market share and so is more 
pervasive.  Monoponistic discretion results in two kinds of problems.  First, 
there can be, and is currently in livestock markets, substantial 
discrimination among producers with respect to the prices and other terms 
of trade they receive.  In beef cattle, for example, favored sellers get the 
advantage of contractual arrangements that assure such producers of prices 
at or above the cash market.
71
  Disfavored sellers are compelled to sell in 
the cash market at whatever prices the buyers offer.  Such cash sellers have 
not necessarily voluntarily chosen to rely on the cash market.  Rather it is 
the capacity of the buyer to refuse to offer contracts combined with the lack 
of a market for the resale of such contracts that creates this effect.
72
  
Reducing the number of competitors thus increases the potential for such 
discrimination on both price and access.
73
 
Second, monopoly buyers are often able to dictate terms and 
conditions that transfer risks to the producer without commensurate 
compensation.
74
  The poultry industry is almost entirely dominated by 
contracts of adhesion many of which have exploitative terms resulting in 
 
 70. For a more extended discussion of this topic, see Carstensen, Buyer Power, supra 
note 10. 
 71. See Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (M.D. Ala. 2004) 
aff’d, 420 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding by jury that cash market sellers had received 
substantially less for their cattle); see also, C. Robert Taylor, Proving Anti-Competitive 
Conduct in the U.S. Courtroom: Economic Issues with the Courts’ Opinions in Pickett v. 
Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 4 J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. art. 9, 1–2 (2006). 
 72. One might contrast the unregulated nature of the market for livestock contracts with 
the carefully worked out procedures of the securities markets governing both the initial 
offering and subsequent resale of publicly traded securities.  Public capital markets suffered 
from seller power to engage in arbitrary, manipulative and discriminatory conduct toward 
buyers.  When that conduct was regulated by the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act public capital markets prospered and grew dramatically.  Livestock 
markets present the reverse situation, buyer rather than seller power.  In each case, part of 
the public policy response should be to regulate the uses of such power directly; but in 
addition, maintaining a competitive market structure on the side with power reduces the 
capacity to exploit that power, because the powerless side of the market will have more 
options. 
 73. See Rogers & Sexton, supra note 55; cf. Steve McCorriston, Why Should Imperfect 
Competition Matter to Agricultural Economists?, 29 EUR. REV. AGRIC. ECON. 349 (2002). 
 74. See generally, Joseph A. Miller, Contracting in Agriculture: Potential Problems, 8 
DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 57 (2003) (discussing the trend toward contracting and its 
implications). 
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uncompensated economic cost and risk falling on the producer.
75
  By 
reducing input costs, the processors are more able to cover their own 
processing costs when facing a downstream market in which the 
subsequent buyer also has buyer power. 
Such exploitation may be counter-productive in the longer run because 
it effectively consumes the capital invested in the production of the input.  
However, for the intermediate processor to survive in the face of powerful 
downstream customers that demand, on an all-or-nothing basis, lower 
prices, there may be a kind of economic compulsion.  The downstream 
buyer, recognizing that its supplier has potential buyer power further 
upstream, impels the exploitation of the powerless input producers that 
have few, or usually no, choices among buyers.  These producers are very 
vulnerable because of the combination of sunk costs and very great 
switching costs.
76
  Hence, there is a kind of ratcheting effect in which the 
downstream pressures cause the processors to transfer more and more risk 
and cost to the producer while holding price of the input down.
77
  Mergers 
that create increased buying power in the more distant, downstream market 
can, therefore, exacerbate these problems of upstream buyer power 
exploitation in both price and non-price terms.
78
 
While some might regard such exploitative conduct as basically a 
matter of wealth transfer having no effect on market competition, this is not 
accurate.  Allocative efficiency in a narrow sense is harmed whenever a 
producer must produce more than the optimal quantity, which is the result 
when the marginal price is less than the marginal cost.  In regulated 
industry contexts, this kind of mismatch between cost and price has 
resulted in serious economic problems.  Moreover, it is important to 
appreciate that the long-run incentives to participate in production markets 
 
 75. See, e.g., Been v. O.K. Indus., 398 F. App’x 382 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
chicken integrator varied supplies of chickens depending on market conditions which had 
the effect of forcing growers who had large fixed investments in their chicken raising 
facilities to absorb the risks resulting from varied output); Adams v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 
No. 2:09-CV-397, 2011 WL 5330301 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding that chicken 
processor engaged in various acts and practices that violated the Packers and Stockyards 
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 182 (2006), in an effort to reduce output and raise the prices paid for 
poultry). 
 76. Rogers & Sexton, supra note 55, at 1143. 
 77. Solutions to important parts of the contract problem must come from other elements 
of agricultural market law.  See, e.g., Been, 398 F. App’x at 382.  Antitrust is not well 
designed nor does it have the precedents to provide regulation over such conduct; but it can 
seek to reduce the risk of such conduct by its attention to the structure of markets. 
 78. Vertical integration by a monopsonist can also facilitate exploitation of latent 
buying power producing, under some conditions, lower input prices and higher consumer 
prices.  See Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, Can Vertical Integration by a 
Monopsonist Harm Consumer Welfare? (Melbourne Business School, University of 
Melbourne, Working Paper, 2004). 
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are a function of the expected gains from the activity.  In a dynamic 
analysis of incentives, it should be obvious that when others appropriate 
most of the wealth produced by an activity, the attractiveness of entry or 
innovation in that activity will be greatly reduced or eliminated.  Thus, the 
greater appropriation of wealth created by farmers through their use of 
modern technology and efficient methods,
79
 the greater the disincentive for 
the next generation to enter farming.  Moreover, as the markets for 
agricultural products fail, the fundamental public interest in retaining a 
viable agricultural sector is likely to call forth further subsidies and other 
market distortions intended to prop up producers.  The dynamic 
interconnection of market practices with these longer run considerations 
provide another of the indirect effects of increased buyer power and 
consequent incentives to engage in conduct that has overall adverse 
implications for the competitive market even if it appears to be rational 
conduct for the firm.
80
 
While economic efficiency in both static and dynamic terms is an 
important outcome of well-crafted antitrust law, the fundamental legal 
policy goal has to be to facilitate the competitive process.  Efficiency in all 
its senses is the usual and expected outcome of that process.  But from a 
policy perspective, the interest has to be in creating and maintaining a 
workably competitive market process.  From that process will come, over 
time, desirable economic results.  This is not to argue that economic 
analyses are irrelevant to the creation and enforcement of antitrust rules.  It 
is, however, to state as strongly as possible that economic analysis must 
serve the process-oriented goals of public policy and not itself be the 
arbiter of what is or is not competitively undesirable. 
 
 79. Jose B. Falek-Zepeda et al., Rent Creation and Distribution from Biotechnology 
Innovations: The Case of Bt Cotton and Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans in 1997, 16 
AGRIBUSINESS 21 (2000); Jose B. Falek-Zepeda et al., Surplus Distribution from the 
Introduction of a Biotechnology Innovation, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 360 (2000). 
 80. The recent economic crisis has led a number of employers to demand major 
concessions from their specialized labor forces.  The threats involve moving production to 
another location within the country or outside it.  Employees are in general vulnerable to 
coercive demands by employers in periods of high unemployment.  But skilled and 
specialized labor face even more serious losses because they are less likely to find 
comparable employment and are therefore more likely to give up wages to avoid 
unemployment.  Examples include companies with significant profits that nonetheless 
engage in these practices.  See, e.g., Harley-Davidson Milwaukee Unions Accept Concession 
Laden Labor Contract, FOX 43 WPMT (Sept. 13, 2010, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.fox43.com/news/wpmt-harley-davidson-contract-vote,0,2259707.story (Harley-
Davidson compelled its workers to accept major pay cuts); see also Harley-Davidson’s 
Fiscal Sitmulus, PORTFOLIO.COM (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:42 AM), 
http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/daily-brief/2010/10/19/harley-davidson-profits-soar-
as-finance-business-takes-off/ (Harley-Davidson subsequently reported record profits). 
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4. Geographic Buyer Discrimination and Spheres of Influence 
Two other uses of buyer power can create serious competitive 
concerns.  Each involves the use of buyer power to have a direct impact on 
the prices paid to sellers.  First, buyers in moderately oligopsonistic 
markets often have the incentive and capacity to engage in geographic price 
discrimination among their suppliers.  That is, each buyer focuses on 
buying from a specific geographic area.  The incentives are obvious and the 
capacity arises whenever some set of sellers has few options.  This can 
happen if the seller’s modest scale makes it impossible to search a larger 
market area.  Other limits on the options available to sellers can be 
inherent, the result of buyer-imposed allocation of sellers precluding 
competing bids, or a consequence of significant switching costs.
81
  Hence, 
just as the merger guidelines recognize in selling markets that the capacity 
to separate out groups of buyers and charge them a higher price reflects a 
relevant market for purposes of analyzing competitive effects, so too on the 
buying side, the analysis has to consider whether the same potential to 
discriminate among classes of sellers might exist.
82
 
Second, buyers’ markets have greater potential to develop 
anticompetitive, linked oligopolies than is likely in seller markets.
83
  
Because of the shared interest in retaining the lowest input prices possible, 
buyers will find it attractive to avoid competition for inputs in so far as 
possible.  Moreover, the risk of retaliation across markets when firms 
compete in the purchase of multiple inputs at multiple locations provides a 
context in which tacit understandings become more enforceable.
84
  Each 
firm will have an incentive to develop its own sources of supply and not 
engage in vigorous competition with rival buyers.  In agricultural markets 
such as poultry, processors tend to avoid building facilities that compete 
very directly.
85
  Each seeks to operate so that it competes for growers, if it 
 
 81. See Lynn Hunnicutt, et al., Rigidity in Packer-Feedlot Relationships, 36 J. AGRIC. & 
APPLIED ECON. 627 (2004) (discussing measures used to describe feedlot-packer relations). 
 82. See Carstensen, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, at 6–7 (arguing that 
regulators must evaluate where sellers can sell). 
 83. See Elinor Harris Solomon, Bank Merger Policies and Problems: A Linkage Theory 
of Oligopoly, 2 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 323 (1970) (discussing market-extension 
mergers in banking); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) 
(denying standing to a single-plant company challenging a multi-plant operator’s purchase 
of a directly competing slaughterhouse). 
 84. It was the risk of predatory buying (raising cattle prices) that motivated Monfort’s 
effort to block the merger creating Cargill’s massive, multi-market beef packing operation.  
Cargill, 479 U.S. at 104 (denying standing because plaintiff would not suffer an antitrust 
injury as result of higher prices to input suppliers).  Having lost the case, Monfort sold out 
to another multi-regional packer.  Company News: Conagra Deal for Monfort, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 1987, at D4. 
 85. JAMES M. MACDONALD, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF 
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competes at all, only at the geographic margins of its supply territory.  One 
form this interaction can take is for a buyer to buy and then close plants 
that are “too competitive” with those of other buyers.
86
  By doing so, the 
new owner reduces competitive pressure on its rival within the rival’s 
sphere of influence and might expect that the rival would reciprocate by 
focusing its buying interests away from other areas of potential overlap.  
Again a central motivation for this ad hoc creation of spheres of influence 
is that each party can expect to gain to the extent that its buyer power is 
enhanced.  Thus, unlike allocating selling markets, the buying side 
allocations have greater potential for self-reinforcement. 
5. Exclusionary Uses of Buyer Power 
Another well documented use of buyer power is to impose constraints 
on the seller that cause other buyers to have higher prices for or even no 
access to an important input.  In a drug case, the buyer got all the major 
suppliers of the key input to agree to exclusive dealing contracts.  The 
result was that competitors were fenced out of the market.
87
  Other 
examples include toy and appliance markets.
88
  Closely related is the use of 




D.  The Indirect Impact of Buyer Power (Upstream Market Impacts)  
In standard merger analysis concerning seller power, the impact on the 
immediate downstream market is the primary focus.  This is sensible 
because if the merger will result in higher prices to that market then the 
 
U.S. BROILER PRODUCTION 4–5 (2008). 
 86. A possible example is the decision of Smithfield to close the Farmland plant in 
Dubuque, Iowa, after buying the company.  Dubuque Packing Company, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dubuque_Packing_Company (last modified Dec. 28, 2011). 
 87. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999) on reconsideration in 
part sub nom. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 88. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Toys “R” Us, Inc. 
v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 89. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 208 (1939) (finding 
that buyer used its power to induce suppliers to engage in horizontal price fixing 
agreement); see also Toys “R” Us, 221 F.3d at 932 (alternative holding that toy buyer 
induced toy producers to enter into horizontal agreement to refuse to deal with buyer’s key 
competitors).  With respect to agent use of buyer power, the best example is in the insurance 
industry where major brokers used their ability to control the buying decisions of major 
insureds to induce insurers to engage in a cartel to raise prices and split the resulting cartel 
profits with the agents.  See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 
2010).  See generally Carstensen, Buyer Cartels, supra note 10 (explaining the differences 
between buyer cartels and buying groups). 
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effects further downstream can be predicted.  While in general the same 
can be said of buyer power, there is more ambiguity as to the explanation 
for lower input prices that might result from a merger.  On their face, such 
“cost savings” appear to promise an efficiency gain.
90
  But the capacity of 
the upstream supplier to provide further price discounts to a consolidated 
buyer may reflect only the ability of that supplier, given its increased 
volume of purchases resulting from the downstream merger, to exert its 
own increased monopsony power against its upstream input providers.  
Thus, the adverse effect of a consolidation in grocery retailing or the 
manufacture of food products may primarily impact farmers and ranchers 
who see the price for the basic ingredients driven down.
91
  These impacts 
may present themselves in the form of lower prices in public markets and 
contracts for supplies.  This price reduction is itself a result of the fact that 
the downstream buyer can induce its supplier to reduce price because of the 
creditable threat of moving the business to another supplier.  Consolidation 
among such downstream buyers creates more leverage over their suppliers 
and so has the capacity to create a new downward pressure on input prices.  
Further, as the downstream buyer consolidates its purchases, it endows its 
upstream supplier with greater buyer power derivatively. 
Another example of this phenomenon is the manipulation of cheese 
prices.
92
  The direct goal of such manipulation was to lower the price of 
cheese for the advantage of major cheese buyers.  By selling cheese on the 
old Green Bay cheese exchange, the major buyer of cheese could 
manipulate the price downward and retard its increase in many situations.  
This allowed it to buy cheese by contract based on the exchange price at 
lower rates than would otherwise exist.  Milk converts to cheese on a 
relatively fixed ratio, and so when the price of their product declined, 
cheese makers reduced the price paid for milk.  While the cheese makers 
may have absorbed a small amount of the price reduction, the great bulk of 
this buyer power was passed on to the dairy farmers.
93
  Obviously, further 
 
 90. E.g., Fee & Thomas, supra note 11 (finding reduced input costs as clear evidence of 
increased efficiency, but to the extent that the cost savings are the result of buyer power 
exploitation of upstream suppliers, that characterization may be incorrect); see text 
accompanying notes 120–25.  See also 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at § 12 (excluding 
wealth transfers from inclusion as a part of an efficiency defense). 
 91. See Einer Elhauge, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED NESTLE-RALSTON PURINA MERGER 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that processors, especially meat 
packers, regularly assert that their buying practices are driven by the demands of powerful 
downstream customers).  See generally UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS INT’L 
UNION, ENDING WALMART’S RURAL STRANGLEHOLD (2010) (offering evidence of the ways 
in which Walmart, the nation’s largest food retailer, exploits its buyer power). 
 92. Mueller et al., supra note 69. 
 93. Dairy farms are, at least in the short run, very price inelastic.  A herd of cows, every 
day, seven days a week, produces a relatively set quantity of milk, depending on the season 
of the year.  Until the herd is liquidated, the dairy farmer has to sell that output at whatever 
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concentration on the cheese buying side of the market would increase the 
incentive and capacity to engage in such manipulation further threatening 
the income of dairy farmers. 
The point is that the impact of anticompetitive conduct on the buyer 
side of the market is often at one or two stages prior to the party bearing the 
immediate impact of the lower price.  A full analysis of the effects of a 
merger that increases buying power needs to trace out the potential for such 
indirect impacts if it is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the 
potential competitive harms from a transaction. 
Such pressures also need to be carefully distinguished from 
transformations in the technology of production or the methods of 
transaction that generate both real cost savings and may result in significant 
changes in demand for inputs.  As discussed below, to obtain overall static 
allocative efficiency gains from mergers creating both some productive 
efficiency and increased buyer power, the productive efficiency gains must 
outweigh the losses.  But from a dynamic perspective, it is essential to 
consider the impact of wealth transfers as well.  Hence, in most cases, the 
combined static and dynamic adverse effects on immediate or more distant 
parts of the supply chain will not be offset by any modest gain to 
productive efficiency. 
E.  Summary about Competitive Effects of Buyer Power 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the myriad ways that buyer 
power, directly and indirectly, can affect the competitive process adversely.  
One might argue that the range of these impacts substantially exceeds the 
range of potential adverse effects that seller power can cause.  On the other 
hand, a critic of current enforcement criteria might respond that the 
analysis of buyer power’s effects might in fact suggest the poverty of 
current conceptions of the harms that seller power can cause.  This analysis 
need not resolve that issue because, regardless of the implications for seller 
power, the fact is that buyer power can cause a wide range of adverse 
competitive effects that go beyond the limited set recognized in seller-
oriented analyses. 
III.  FITTING THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF BUYER POWER TO MERGER 
ANALYSIS 
Before considering the structural thresholds that should trigger more 
focused inquiry concerning a merger or acquisition involving buyer power 
issues, it will be helpful to organize the competitive effects discussed in 
 
price the market provides. 
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Part II into the categories used in the merger guidelines to determine 
whether a merger “may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend 
to create a monopoly  . . . .”
94
  As with seller-side mergers, buyer-side 
mergers involving significant change in the structure of the buying side can 
result in both unilateral and coordinated anticompetitive effects. 
A.  Coordinated Effects 
As suggested previously, the nature of buying inputs in contrast to 
selling outputs creates a different set of incentives with respect to cheating 
on a tacit collusion to restrict price or allocate suppliers.  Basically, the 
immediate effect of “cheating” is to raise input costs or even create a trade 
war if one buyer “poaches” on the sources of supply tacitly assigned to 
another buyer.  Thus, the gains to the deviant can occur only after the input 
is converted to an output (often requiring that other costly inputs also be 
acquired), but the deviation is more likely to be immediately apparent to 
rivals.  Hence, the lag in obtaining gains makes deviation more risky. 
These inherent lags in the system of production differentiate buyer 
collusion from seller collusion in terms of retaliation.  Hence, buyer 
collusion can be more effective because of the lags.  The deviant’s input 
prices can be driven up even more by selection bidding, and its downstream 
prices can be undermined by similarly selective selling.  This is possible 
because most goods are not sold in anonymous open markets, but rather 
involve direct transactions.  Hence, those firms wishing to enforce a tacit 
understanding can target the specific suppliers of the deviant.  This is akin 




Various scholarly studies provide further support for this conclusion.  
Marshall and Meurer present a model of bidding auctions in which it is not 
possible to disrupt the conspiracy.
96
  Asker’s study of a postal buyers’ 
cartel found that it was possible to sustain the cartel even when there was 
turnover among the participants.
97
  Finally, Hunnicutt and others found that 
there was very substantial stability in the identity of the buyer from cattle 
feedlots.
98




Thus, the probability of tacit collusion is significant whenever there 
are relatively few buyers.  This is especially likely when there are 
 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 95. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 714 (1948). 
 96. Marshall & Meurer, supra note 10. 
 97. Asker, supra note 10. 
 98. Hunnicutt et al., supra note 81. 
 99. Cai et al., supra note 52. 
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numerous sellers, which makes it more feasible to allocate suppliers and 
make each highly dependent on its continued relationship with the specific 
buyer.  In this way, the coordinated effect of allocation is a prelude to the 
use of unilateral power to further exploit the upstream supplier.  Moreover, 
the coordination can take the form of standardizing input elements or even 
contract terms in ways that increase the relative gain to the coordinating 
buyers.  Again because of the costs of deviating from such collective 
conduct, the risks of harm to competition are greater than they would be in 
seller side contexts and can occur even with moderately large numbers of 
buyers relative to what standard theory predicts on the selling side. 
The fundamental implication is that where the merged buyer reduces 
the number of competing buyers in any relevant input market to a modest 
number (but one substantially larger than appears used in seller mergers) 
there is a cognizable risk of coordinated conduct.  Only if the sellers can 
convert their productive capacity to other product lines easily and with a 
reasonable prospect of selling the resulting output is there likely to be a 
significant constraint on the incentive of such buyers to coordinate their 
buying actions. 
B.  Unilateral Effects 
A central element of efficient product markets is the capacity of 
buyers to pay different prices for inputs as their demand increases or 
decreases.  The alternative in the context of rising prices is that all prior 
inputs must be re-priced to the new, higher price.  Hence, the incremental 
unit drives up the cost of all units.  This is a particularly challenging issue 
in labor markets where uniform pay levels are more common.
100
  But for 
other inputs, purchased in a sequential way, the price will vary overtime.  
This smoothes out demand and encourages the marginal purchase. 
But this same capacity to pay different prices is central to the 
unilateral risks that merged buyers will present to the competitive process.  
In consequence the analysis of potential unilateral effects is complex and 
contingent on the options available to both buyers and sellers.  The greater 
the price elasticity of supply, the less likely are the effects to be 
significantly adverse.  Thus, the focus is on the ability of sellers to adjust 




 100. This fact may explain why price fixing and other coordination are recurring issues 
in labor markets as illustrated in Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 101. Another unilateral effect analysis would focus on the potential impact on suppliers 
if the merging firms were leading buyers of different inputs where each type of input was 
the closest alternative product line for suppliers to offer in the event that their primary line 
was subject to monopsony or oligopsony effects.  In such a case, by having substantial 
stakes in the two input lines, the merged firm would be more able to impose its will on its 
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One strategy that can limit the flexibility of sellers is the use of an all-
or-nothing contract.
102
  There, the buyer has appropriated the efficiency 
gains of the producer.  Moreover, there are adverse implications for the 
competitive process because marginal cost of the last unit sold exceeds the 
marginal price paid for it.  From the perspective of the competitive process, 
therefore, the more appropriate analysis is that this transfer has a long run 
negative effect since it denies to the efficient producer the opportunity to 
receive the reward for its effort.  Ultimately, this will discourage 
investment and innovation in a market subject to such appropriation.  Thus, 
when sellers are vulnerable to all-or-nothing contracts (e.g., when the buyer 
tends to take most or all of a seller’s output as in employment contracts or 
sales from cattle feed lots), the potential for such adverse effects from 
mergers creating an enhanced capacity either to impose such contracts or to 
limit the options of sellers to move among potential buyers demands 
careful assessment of the degree of risk created.  In the long run, it is likely 
that the exploited producers will gradually exit the market, as farmers, for 
example, are doing.  At some point, either government subsidies or imports 
from distant sources will become necessary.
103
 
Another unilateral effect that is a function of mergers creating buyer 
power is an upstream impact stemming from the consolidation of buying 
resulting from the merger.  The consolidated firm can centralize its buying, 
reducing the number of suppliers.  In doing so, it can generate substantial 
competition among its potential suppliers.  The winner is now a much more 
significant buyer of upstream inputs to its product.  As a result it now has 
more buyer power and an obvious incentive to exploit that power.  It can do 
so by driving down input prices through exercise of buyer power in those 
input markets where it has sufficient dominance to impose its will while 
making up the lost volume from purchases in other more competitive 
markets as described above.  Alternatively, it can employ all-or-nothing 
contracts to retain the same volume of inputs, but reducing the total price 
 
suppliers given the combined domination of the purchases of the next best alternative output 
for the producers. 
 102. BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 9, 
at 73; see also C. Robert Taylor, Monopsony and the All or Nothing Supply Curve: Putting 
the Squeeze on Suppliers (Auburn Univ., Working Paper No. ES.6.2003) (on file with 
author). 
 103. One of the often overlooked points is that buyers can exploit producers where some 
producers have higher and some have lower cost even if that results in shrinking the supply 
substantially so long as there are other sources from which the growing deficit can be filled.  
This appears to be what is happening in agriculture with increased imports of dairy and meat 
products to fill the gaps created by the exit from domestic production.  Even if the average 
cost of the imports exceeds the price that would have been paid for similar domestic 
production, if the gain from exploitation exceeds the extra costs, it will be rational for the 
buyer to engage in such exploitation. 
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A buyer may as a result of a merger be able, unilaterally, to use its 
power, as Broadway-Hale and Toys “R” Us did, to demand other kinds of 
exclusionary favors from its suppliers.
105
  In these situations, price may be 
less important to the buyer than is the protection of its position in the retail 
market from competition.  Hence, the buyer uses its power to demand 
either coordinated or unilateral refusals to deal with its competitors as the 
price of its continued patronage.  From the perspective of a rational seller, 
there is a manifest trade-off between the gains from a continued course of 
dealing with the large volume buyer and the potential to develop other 
markets.  The most likely result of that balancing is to support the 
incumbent buyer’s demands to exclude new or marginal competitors. 
Finally, increased buying power can result in the “waterbed” effect.
106
  
The buyer forces down the prices it has to pay for inputs below the long run 
average cost of the seller.  The volume of sales is such that the seller cannot 
effectively transfer this volume of sales to other outlets.  Hence, it must 
either reduce its overall operating expenses or increase its prices to its other 
customers in order to achieve a revenue stream that is equal to its long run 
costs.  Such an impact can occur whether or not the upstream supplier has 
the ability to exploit its own suppliers.  The point is that the buyer is getting 
an advantage that is not cost-justified. 
The waterbed case is distinguishable from the context in which the 
supplier has been charging supra-competitive prices and now is charging a 
more competitive, but above average total cost, price to a large buyer.  
Here the seller continues to exploit its power over its other customers by 
raising prices to restore its overall margin of profit.  In such a case, the 
implications are very conflicted.  The merger has increased exploitation of 
other customers of the supplier, but has at the same time reduced the prices 
paid by the merged entity.  If the downstream market is workably 
competitive, it is possible that the price increases will not hold because the 
upstream supplier will lose such a volume of sales as a result of raising the 
prices of the competitors of the buyer.  On the other hand, the merged 
buyer may see this as another benefit of the merger because it indirectly 
raises rivals’ costs. 
 
 104. An illustration of this kind of secondary effect is the history of cheese price 
manipulation, where the immediate effect was to drive down the price of cheese paid to 
cheese makers, but dairy farmers bore the ultimate burden as cheese companies reduced the 
price they paid for milk.  See generally Mueller et al., supra note 69. 
 105. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 207 (1959); Toys “R” Us, 
Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 106. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (explaining the “waterbed” effect). 
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C.  A Framework for Analysis of the Likely Adverse Competitive Effects of 
Increased Buyer Power 
One test for whether a merger may create undue buyer power is a 
close and critical analysis of the expectations of the merged enterprise with 
respect to cost savings on the buying side.  If there are no readily apparent 
transactional gains or economies of scale, then the most likely explanation 
is that the merged enterprise expects to use buyer power to force down 
input prices directly.  In any such case, the analysis then needs to look 
critically at the basis on which the sellers can reduce price.  The recent 
Bhattacharyya and Nain article, for example, reports that where sellers are 
concentrated, buyers are able to force down prices without any evidence of 
reduced input costs for the sellers.
107
  Thus, the implication is that in such 
contexts the increased buyer power resulted in countervailing bargaining 
power that moved prices closer to a competitive level without significant 
upstream impacts.  But within that sample there was a good deal of 
heterogeneity reflected in the relatively low power of the equations to 
explain observed variances.
108
  Hence, further transaction specific inquiry is 
relevant in such cases to ascertain whether the change in downstream buyer 
power will affect the buyer power of the upstream supplier with respect to 
its input suppliers.  It is in this situation that the indirect competitive effects 
of a merger take on greater significance in examining the merits of the 
transaction.  It is conceivable that the expected gains of the downstream 
buyer could come largely or exclusively from creating more buyer power in 
its suppliers and compelling them to exploit further their upstream input 
sources. 
D.  Summary on Competitive Effects 
Central to the analysis of the competitive impact of buyer power is the 
capacity of the buyer to be the decision-maker about purchases.  This 
insight demands that those evaluating the likely effects of mergers where 
the resulting firm will be a substantial buyer of any type of input must 
consider the risks associated with such discretionary actions.  Both the 
 
 107. Bhattacharyya & Nain, supra note 11, at 108. 
 108. Id. at 108–10 tbls. 5 & 6 (stating that the R2 for the overall equations ranged from 
.19 to .45 which indicates that much of the observed variance was unexplained).  Moreover, 
when examined for other characteristics affecting input prices, there were statistically 
significant negative changes in wages for workers in the supply industry in six of the ten 
variations in the equations.  Wage reduction is a classic example of upstream input suppliers 
being forced to accept lower prices as a result of indirect buyer power.  This is not the only 
explanation for reduced wages as it is also possible that some cartel or oligopoly profits had 
been distributed to employees and the buyer pressure created the need to reduce such 
“excessive” wages. 
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probability of coordinated effects and the potential for unilateral effects 
having significant capacity to distort the efficient and dynamic operation of 
upstream input markets exist whenever the merger will result in even a 
moderate increase in concentration in buying markets.  Such effects are not, 
of course, necessarily probable.  Other market characteristics, as discussed 
earlier, may modify or even make impractical the use of buyer power to 
achieve any anticompetitive effect.  But, the central point is that such 
effects require careful examination.  But such an examination is not 
recognized or defined in the current Guidelines. 
One important practical implication of buyer side mergers is that 
sellers may be more reluctant to complain, because of the risks of adverse 
reactions from the parties to the merger.  If the merger is consummated 
despite a complaint, the merged firm may well refuse to buy at all or 
impose onerous conditions on its purchases.  Even if the merger is stopped, 
the two firms may still refuse to deal or deal on harsher terms with a 
complainant.
109
  The central difference is that in the case where buyer 
power is a concern, the buyer retains, post-merger, the discretion to buy or 
not to buy.  This is different from the seller side merger where the customer 
is the party with discretion in any situation short of monopoly.  This fact 
about future relationships means that evaluation should rest more on 
presumptions arising from market position and other objective criteria, and 
less on whether there are complaints from sellers of inputs. 
IV.  MARKET DEFINITION 
Market definition is a useful first step in assessing the probability that 
undue buyer power might result from a merger of two firms that are 
competitors in some input market.  By identifying the likely product and 
geographic dimensions of the market it is possible to estimate the increase 
in concentration of buying that will result.  Indeed, as the prior analysis has 
shown, there is a more consistent inference of risks of anticompetitive 
consequences when buyer power is examined than current thinking would 
suggest in the case of increased concentration of seller power. 
The new Guidelines correctly focus market definition on the buying 
side of the merged firm.
110
  Indeed, competing buyers might not compete at 
all in the downstream selling markets, either because they use the inputs in 
different outputs or because they sell their outputs in different geographic 
markets.  Alternatively, the merged entities’ outputs may be sold in 
 
 109. As an anecdotal matter, I can report that I have had sellers tell me that they would 
not discuss their concerns with antitrust enforcers because of fear of such retaliation. 
 110. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 13 at § 12 (“In defining relevant markets, the 
Agencies focus on the alternatives available to sellers in the face of a decrease in the price 
paid by a hypothetical monopsonist.”) 
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sufficiently competitive downstream markets that post-merger there is no 
concern on the selling side.  This, however, does not affect their interest or 
potential ability to exercise buyer power.  Rather, the focus has to be on the 
role of merging firms as buyers; if they buy a significant quantity of the 
same or related inputs, then in combination they are likely to have at least 
some buyer power.  Hence, both the product and geographic dimensions of 
the buying market must be investigated from the perspective of where a 
seller might look for alternative buyers. 
In defining selling markets, merger analysis has often relied on a test 
that focuses on whether a firm controlling a set of products in a geographic 
market could raise prices by a small but significant and non-transitory 
amount.  This is the SSNIP test, but it needs to be adapted to the buying 
side process.  For example, if a buyer can obtain some necessary part of its 
input from some out-of-market source and that source has relatively good 
price elasticity of production, then it is feasible for the buyer to exercise 
power over a set of sellers, even if the sellers would reduce output 
substantially.  This is the kind of response that would, on the selling side, 
suggest that some larger market must exist.  But on the buying side, even 
such responses might still indicate buyer power, as the buyer need only 
consider the trade-off of the input cost savings from reducing prices, even 
if it results in a much lower volume in the captive market and replacing lost 
input by reference to the price of the other source.  In short, the buying side 
market must be carefully defined in terms of the economic realities facing 
producers.  The question then becomes what product and geographic 
dimensions must exist for a buyer to have market power over the relevant 
group of sellers? 
A.  Product Market Definition 
When defining buyer product markets, the crucial question ought to be 
what alternatives are open to the producer of the inputs used by the 
merging buyers.  In some cases, the producers may have a great deal of 
flexibility to adapt their production to yield different products useful as 
inputs by various other buyers.  If, in addition, entry by these producers 
into those alternative outlet markets is relatively easy, then either such 
related markets should be included in the basic product market or other 
appropriate account of such seller flexibility should be taken.  But it is 
likely often to be the case that the producer is relatively specialized in a 
line or lines of products and shifting production will not be feasible. 
The potential inflexibility of output is illustrated in agriculture where a 
chicken operation cannot easily convert to turkeys and would be totally 
useless for dairy cattle or hogs.  In contrast, a crop farmer can switch from 
soybeans to corn or related crops within a season based on predictions of 
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relative prices and costs.  However, when there is consolidation among 
grain buyers, such that the same small set of buyers are taking the 
soybeans, corn, wheat, and sorghum, the flexibility to switch among crops 
is of little relevance. 
Milk illustrates another product market definition concern.  Milk has a 
number of uses including cheese, ice cream, butter, and fluid milk.  By 
virtue of government regulation, fluid milk use earns a higher price.  
Hence, dairy farmers want to share in that price.
111
  In such a context, the 
relevant product market is limited to milk used for fluid sales.  This is an 
example of discrimination in a product market definition.  Here, the 
differentiation is a result of government policies.  In other circumstances, 
institutional or market characteristics may well cause similar segmentation 
of apparently homogenous product markets. 
B.  Geographic Market Definition 
As in the case of product market definition, the challenge in 
geographic market definition is to understand where sellers can realistically 
look for alternative outlets for their goods.  In refusing to challenge a 
merger between the only two major hog processors in the Southeast, the 
DOJ claimed that there was no risk to hog raisers because mature hogs 
could be shipped over 400 miles to a slaughter facility in central 
Tennessee.
112
  Those knowledgeable of the business regarded this claim as 
highly questionable.  In the long run, the risks of weight loss and death, as 
well as the high cost of long distance shipping of live animals, made this an 




 111. The pricing of milk is a complex and convoluted process.  See generally BOB CROPP 
& ED JESSE, BASIC MILK PRICING CONCEPTS FOR DAIRY FARMERS (2008) (discussing pricing 
structures for sale and production of milk).  For present purposes it suffices that the farmer 
can share in the premium for fluid use only if the farmer’s milk is pooled in some way that 
makes it available for use as fluid milk.  Hence, those with access to fluid processing plants 
have significant capacity to control the milk supplies.  See generally In re Se. Milk Antitrust 
Litig., 555 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (upholding plaintiff milk farmers’ antitrust 
claims against a 12(b)(6) motion by milk buyer defendants). 
 112. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close Its Investigation of Smithfield, Inc. (May 4, 
2007) (focusing its study on the merger’s effects on pork sale competition and its reduction 
in prices), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/223077.pdf. 
 113. I interviewed a number of economists who were experts on the hog and pork 
markets.  While some did not see serious competitive issues with respect to the Midwest 
(the other region where the two firms competed as buyers), there was substantial consensus 
that hog producers in the Southeast would be adversely affected.  Because of its traditional 
secrecy, the DOJ did not reveal the basis on which it reached its conclusion that hogs could 
be shipped long distances.  Moreover, a contemporaneous economic study of the hog-pork 
industry found that prior to the merger, nationally, there was clear evidence of buyer power.  
See RTI INT’L, VOL. 4: HOG AND PORK INDUSTRIES FINAL REPORT, GIPSA LIVESTOCK AND 
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Logistical considerations may also make it important that other inputs 
be produced close to the place of consumption.  Recent experience with 
weather and other disruptions has reinforced recognition of the risks 
associated with long-distance supply chains in many situations.  On the 
other hand, some products, as the recent problems with melamine from 
China illustrate, can move vast distances.  In general, the primary 
characteristic of products having a global market is that they are, relative to 
their value, of low weight and consumed in relatively low volume.  Hence, 
their transportation in a global market is feasible. 
Government inspection and certification requirements can introduce 
another level of complication in defining geographic markets.  For 
example, genetically modified crops and animals cannot be sold in some 
countries, and even when saleable, they often must be registered and 
approved for sale in the consuming country.  The cost, burden, and delay in 
such registration may effectively limit the market in which inputs can be 
sold even if there are no physical barriers. 
C.  Conclusions about Market Definition 
In sum, buyer side market definition is roughly “analogous” to that on 
the seller side.  But both the product and geographic dimensions can be and 
often are quite different from the downstream selling side markets in which 
the parties are involved.  As a result, the evaluation of the merger must 
focus on input rather than output markets, but even more importantly, must 
focus on where sellers can sell and not where buyers might buy.  Finally, 
the SSNIP test needs to be modified to take account of input substitution by 
buyers.  Nothing less will permit objectively reliable evaluation of the 
merits of mergers affecting buying power. 
V.  LEVELS OF PRESUMPTIVE HARM 
Every buyer of any size has some power, especially in a face-to-face 
market context, to bargain over prices and other conditions with its input 
suppliers.  Moreover, increased size at some modest levels may well result 
in a buyer more able to bargain both because the increased total cost of the 
input now makes bargaining more rational in terms of expected gains and 
because, as a larger entity, it may well pay for the buyer to invest in better 
information about available sources and prices of inputs.  Hence, the 
question for consideration is when the increased buyer power is so 
concentrated that it “may substantially” lessen competition. 
 
MEAT MARKETING STUDY (2007) (describing various alternative marketing arrangements 
and uses).  Thus, the merger increased concentration both regionally and nationally, and so 
would exacerbate the problems of buyer power. 
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The essential first step is to realize that this capacity to choose among 
potential suppliers can create a great deal of power even when the buyer’s 
market share is modest by seller side measures.
114
  Indeed, the reason that 
fairly high market shares are used in assessing when seller combinations 
create risks of competitive harm is because buyers have the discretion to 
switch suppliers and thus destabilize the potential market power effects of a 
selling side merger. 
In the UK, single firm market shares of less than 10% of all of some 
class of groceries purchased in the country have produced significant 
unilateral buyer power effects.
115
  In Toys “R” Us, the market share that 
allowed the firm to impose anticompetitive restraints on its suppliers was 
about 20% of the national market for toys.
116
  While no market share is 
reported in the Klor’s case, it is unlikely that Broadway-Hale dominated 
the retail appliance market in California or nationally, but it still had the 
power to coerce its suppliers into agreeing to cut off Klor’s.
117
  These cases 
suggest that unilateral effects are possible from mergers resulting in control 
of 10% to 20% of the buying market. 
Economies and diseconomies in production affect the unilateral 
market power of buyers.  A plausible reason for the power of a 10% buyer 
in the retail grocery business is that a threatened reduction in volume of 
10% could cause a firm significant diseconomies of scale, especially if it 
will be difficult to find an alternative outlet for that quantity of 
production.
118
  If a supplier serves a group of buyers where none takes a 
 
 114. A buyer able to affect 10% or more of producer’s output assuming any kind of 
economies of scale has the potential for considerable leverage over that seller.  Another 
relevant condition is whether there is another outlet for this production that is easily 
accessible.  The Blair-Harrison Index of Buyer Power predicts that under some conditions, 
i.e., elasticity of supply and fringe demand equal to one, such a firm can impose a 5% 
decrease on its suppliers prices.  BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
supra note 9, at 59.  Manifestly, in most industrial situations, a change in output for a 
producer in the 10% or greater range is likely to result in significant short-term impact at the 
very least.  With longer-term impact uncertain, under such circumstances every major buyer 
has significant leverage over such a producer.  When the buyer takes a much higher 
percentage of a specific sellers output, the dislocation resulting from the lost sales 
opportunity will be even greater assuming the seller has relatively few alternative outlets 
readily available. 
 115. See Paul W. Dobson, Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from the British Grocery 
Trade, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 529, 535 (2005) (discussing the typical British consumer’s 
loyalty towards their favorite retailer).  One might question whether there is any reason to 
think that smaller markets in terms of total sales volume may result in buyer power at 
smaller market shares than would be the case in markets with larger total volumes.  This is 
the kind of question that ought to be under consideration in rethinking the merger 
guidelines, but to date has received no noticeable attention. 
 116. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 117. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
 118. The potential lack of alternative outlets either in the market as a whole or in a 
regional segment important to achieving efficient use of national advertising makes retail 
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very large volume, the total volume of purchases can allow the supplier to 
achieve scale economies.  However if two of those buyers combine so that 
after their combination their combined purchases would significantly affect 
the volume of sales for the producer, then the producer will become 
dependent on the merged buyer’s continued patronage.
119
  This in turn can 
confer on such a buyer a great deal of buyer power with respect to that 
seller.  The extent of that power will be a function of the diseconomies that 
might result from reduction in output, as well as the potential that the 
producer can find other outlets for its products.  This is the converse of the 
committed and uncommitted entrant analysis,
120
 but now it must be framed 
in terms of committed and uncommitted buyers.  This raises a host of 
questions specific to the likely impact of the merged firm as a larger 
volume buyer of an input. 
A second context where buyer power may arise at relatively low 
market shares occurs when the buyer takes all or most of the output of the 
seller and the merger eliminates the next best alternative outlet for such a 
seller.
121
  Switching totally from one buyer to another involves greater 
transition costs and risks.  If the switch does not work out, the seller may 
now be without any market for its output.  Cattle feedlots are a potential 
example.  No one feedlot is essential to the packer’s volume, but each 
feedlot needs to make sales regularly.  Hence, the ability of a regular 
customer to refuse to deal or impose lower prices is quite substantial as the 
number of alternative outlets decline.
122
  Thus, in such contexts, mergers 
among such buyers will be likely to have significant effect on the power of 
all buyers in the market because of the reduction in alternative outlets. 
The implication of these studies and examples is that mergers that 
create buyer control over 15% to 20% of an input market merit a focused 
review with respect to potential unilateral effects.  As Blair and Harrison 
have shown, the relative levels of elasticity on both the supply and demand 
side very much affect the level of power that will result.
123
  Supply side 
 
buyer power analysis an especially important focal point. 
 119. This effect is most likely in contexts such as grocery retailing where the seller 
already is selling to other major outlets.  Hence, the lost sales cannot easily or readily be 
recouped by adding other outlets. 
 120. See Carstensen, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, at 15–16, 27–29 
(discussing “rapid entrants” and entry conditions). 
 121. This is in part the explanation for why the Antitrust Division challenged mergers 
among health insurers where the market shares were below the safe harbor levels that the 
Division’s own guidelines set for health care buying groups.  See MARK J. BOTTI, 
OBSERVATIONS ON AND FROM THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S BUYER-SIDE CASES: HOW CAN 
“LOWER” PRICES VIOLATE THE ANTITRUST LAWS? (2007) (explaining the Antitrust 
Division’s enforcement actions regarding competition between healthcare providers). 
 122. See Sandford, supra note 27. 
 123. BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 9, 
at 36–42; see also Sexton & Zhang, supra note 10. 
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market structure may also be relevant, as a concentrated supply side may 
produce countervailing power.  However, such power may result in higher 
consumer prices, as the concentrated buyers and concentrated sellers 
collectively raise input prices and find ways to share the overcharge even if 
the downstream market appears competitive.
124
  The problem of buying 
side “efficiencies” is discussed below. 
Secondly, as Todd teaches, it is possible for a more dispersed set of 
buyers to find it rational to coordinate their buying activities than would be 
the likely case on the selling side of the market.  This occurs for a couple of 
interrelated reasons.  Buyers generally share an interest in reducing input 
prices, especially when lower prices, e.g., wages, do not trigger a 
significant decrease in supply.  Closely related, the benefit of cheating on a 
price-reducing understanding is minimal.  The immediate effect is to 
increase the costs of the deviant.  If that deviant is selling into a 
competitive output market, its costs will go up and so its margin will 
decrease.  Only if any resulting output increase were very substantial and 
durable would the deviant expect to gain.  Thus, input collusion is more 
self-policing and can accommodate many more parties than would output 
collusion.
125
  Hence, lower levels of concentration can create risks of 
coordinated effects.  This also provides a reason for looking at mergers 
involving competing buyers even when the overall market for inputs would 
not appear concentrated from the perspective of conventional seller-side 
analysis.  Put in somewhat different terms, a reduction from six to five 
substantial buyers should be a cause for concern.  Even greater concern 
should exist when the reduction in buyers results in a universe of major 
buyers that is four or fewer.  Thus, when the post-merger Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (“HHI”) calculation approaches 2000, there should be 
careful review of any merger that increases the HHI by 100 points or more. 
This is not to say that all mergers resulting in a 15% or 20% control of 
an input market should be illegal.  It is to urge that such mergers need more 
inquiry than they now receive and that if the post-merger HHI exceeds 
2000, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the merger is illegal.  
The central point of this section is to emphasize that the standard for 
triggering further review of the merits of a merger where there is 
demonstrable increase in concentration on the buyer side should be 
substantially lower than the comparable measure on the selling side. 
 
 124. See Chris Doyle & Martijn A. Han, Efficient Cartelization through Stable Buyer 
Groups (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 2009-03, 2012) (discussing 
the formation and effects of cartels). 
 125. See Marshall & Meurer, supra note 10, for an in-depth analysis of bidder collusion. 
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VI.  DEFENSES AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MERGERS CREATING BUYER 
POWER 
A.  Economies Resulting from the Merger 
Contemporary merger policy assumes that most mergers result in real 
efficiency gains for the parties.  This premise is empirically questionable.
126
  
But given its significance in actual enforcement decisions, it is important to 
define carefully the kinds of efficiencies that buying-side mergers might 
legitimately claim.  These efficiencies can arise from transactional cost 
savings or, in some circumstances, economies of scale or scope that 
upstream suppliers might achieve and share given a large assured volume 
of business. 
The new guidelines make the point that transferring producer surplus 
to buyers is not an efficiency gain.
127
  This point is important because the 
most likely source of “efficiency” on the buying side is a lower price for 
inputs.  The guideline position requires that the gains be disaggregated to 
identify the functional cause for a lower price.  A transfer based on 
enhanced buyer power does not change any of the production or transaction 
costs involved in producing or supplying the input.  However, when the 
“transfer” reflects a reduction in a heretofore supra-competitive price 
charged by the supplier, the fact that in some sense this is only a wealth 
transfer should not necessarily trigger a negative view of the merger.  As 
discussed above, such mergers raise complex questions because of the need 
to focus on the likely impact of such price reductions on the suppliers of 
the seller and on the prices to be charged to other customers of the seller. 
There is, furthermore, a tension between potential economies resulting 
from combinations increasing buying side concentration and the risks of 
adverse effects.  It is a commonplace of merger analysis that efficiencies 
are easy to claim and hard to prove.  This is in substantial part because very 
few efficiencies are unique to a particular firm specific market 
organization.  For the great majority there are, in the words of Mao, “many 
roads” to efficiency.  This is especially the case when each of the 
combining firms is already a multi-plant operation enjoying most or all of 
the economies of scale.  In the beef and pork industries, a rough estimate is 
that eight to ten firms each operating two or three plants could exist in this 
country and all those enterprises would be at or above minimum efficient 
scale.
128
  In such contexts, there is unlikely to be any appreciable real 
 
 126. See generally F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 
52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 10–19 (2001) (pointing to data of mergers resulting in sub-
optimal efficiency to rebut the premise that mergers always enhance efficiency). 
 127. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 128. Peter C. Carstensen, Concentration and the Destruction of Competition in 
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production cost savings resulting from the combination of these firms.  It is 
equally hard to imagine that combining such buyers would significantly 
reduce transaction costs of buying inputs.  Hence, any significant reduction 
in costs from such a merger is likely to arise only from driving down the 
price of inputs.  But absent evidence of seller cartelization or other market 
power on the selling side, there is no reason to believe that seller prices are 
excessive.  Therefore, the most likely explanation for the putative 
“efficiency” gains is that they represent the potential for exploitation of 
monopsony power.  It bears emphasis that a monopsonist has no incentive 
to share any of those gains with downstream customers unless the 
downstream buyer itself has power that drives the upstream market 
exploitation. 
This is not to deny that there could not be some efficiency gain 
combined with the increased monopsony power that a merger generates.  
The questions are whether such a combination will advance static 
allocative efficiency and the long run need for dynamic efficiency in the 
market.  The famous Williamson tradeoff argument suggests that there is a 
real possibility of a gain.
129
  There are those who are critical of 
Williamson’s model, but more importantly, for our purposes, it focuses on 
the downstream markets in which goods are sold.  Richard Sexton and 
Mingxia Zhang have examined the trade off between increased monopsony 
power and increased efficiency in production.
130
  Their conclusions are that 
the balance tips strongly against a net allocative efficiency gain from such 
combinations if the firm has both buyer and seller power unless the 
productive efficiency gain is very large.  Indeed, both consumers and 
producers are at risk of exploitation.
131
  Hence, the use of combined market 
power is likely to overwhelm the incentives to lower price and increase 
output arising from some productive efficiencies.  This again suggests the 
need for a more complete analysis of mergers where there are increases in 
power in both buying and selling markets.  In combination the adverse 
effects can be much more significant than would appear if the investigation 
focused on only one side or the other. 
 
Agricultural Markets: The Case for Change in Public Policy, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 531, 537 
(2000). 
 129. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-
Offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (developing a model illustrating the tradeoffs in mergers 
between efficiency gains in production and losses from price increases; Williamson 
emphasizes the need for recognition of efficiencies).  See also Roger D. Blair, Merger to 
Monopsony: An Efficiencies Defense, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 689 (2010) (applying the 
Williamson analysis to buyer side mergers). 
 130. Sexton & Zhang, supra note 10.  See also Rogers & Sexton, supra note 55 (noting 
the potential efficiency gains in oligopsony of agricultural markets)55. 
 131. Sexton & Zhang, supra note 10.  See also de Fontenay & Gans, supra note 78 
(arguing that vertical integration by a monopsonist may harm consumers). 
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If the firm has only buyer power, the Sexton-Zhang model shows that 
the static trade-offs require less productive efficiency gains to offset the 
deadweight loss resulting from increased monopsony power.  But the 
model also shows that there is a very substantial wealth transfer from 
sellers to such a buyer.  In dynamic terms, such a transfer would create a 
strong disincentive to enter or innovate in the selling side of such a market.  
Thus, the exploitation of buyer power in this way creates a long run 
adverse competitive effect. 
Real efficiency gains need to be carefully distinguished from the 
wealth transfers that result from the exercise of monopsony power.  Such 
power can force down the price of inputs transferring upstream producer 
wealth to the downstream buyer.  The gain to the buyer is at best a 
pecuniary gain and does not involve change in the social costs of 
production.  It is likely, however, that much of the gain that merging parties 
claim to arise from their combination upon careful examination will be 
merely a wealth transfer.  As such it should not be accepted as an efficiency 
justification for the merger.  In fact, such gains provide direct evidence that 
such a merger will result in buyer power that the merged entity intends to 
exploit. 
B.  Failing Firm Analysis 
In reviewing claims that a target is a failing firm, one of the 
considerations is whether alternative buyers exist for the firm that would 
not create the same competitive risks.  Here again, any such transaction 
should be examined from a buyer’s as well as seller’s perspective.  For 
example, Smithfield was allowed to buy the Farmland’s pork processing 
operations following Farmland’s bankruptcy.
132
  In allowing the 
transaction, the Antitrust Division focused on the downstream effects in 
pork markets.
133
  It failed to consider the upstream implications for regional 
hog producers, especially lower volume producers who had limited 
geographic mobility.  If the adverse impact on those sellers had been 
considered, the alternative bidder for the assets that had no other hog 
processing operations would have been clearly more desirable from a 
competitive perspective. 
 
 132. Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Inc., Smithfield Foods Agrees to Purchase 
Farmland Foods Business (July 15, 2003) (on file with author), available at 
http://investors.smithfieldfoods.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=296755. 
 133. Chris Flores, Smithfield Foods to Acquire Farmland Outbids Ribal Cargill with 
$367M Offer, DAILY PRESS, Oct. 14, 2003, at C8. 
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C.  Power Sellers 
One final defense that might be relevant is that of “power sellers” to 
which the buyer merger would create “countervailing power” in the sense 
that Galbraith used the term.  As the foregoing analysis has shown, this is a 
tenuous claim.  Buyers, as deciders, have the capacity to induce new entry 
and otherwise stimulate competition in supply markets.  On the other hand, 
increased concentration on the buying side is reflected upstream by 
increased concentration often extending further up the input chain.  There 
is some empirical data that would support the contention that increased 
buyer power can ameliorate the potential of seller power in concentrated 
markets, but the more pro-competitive strategy is to compel existing buyers 
to find other means to induce increased supplier competition.
134
  Only if the 
concentration in the input market is driven by some inherent technological 
factors, would such offsetting buyer power seem plausible.
135
  Even then 
the dynamic cost is the loss of competition in innovation that would 




 The review and workshop process for reconsidering the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines was an important step in reviving and focusing merger 
enforcement.  The all-but-exclusive focus on the selling side of the market, 
in which the only role conceived for buyers is their possible ameliorating 
effect on anticompetitive seller mergers, reflects a narrow and conventional 
vision held by those defining the questions to be considered.  The ongoing 
revision process did produce a somewhat more open and nuanced view of 
the potential adverse competitive effects that mergers affecting buyer 
power can create.  However, the resulting section on mergers creating 
 
 134. Bhattacharyya & Nain, supra note 11. 
 135. There was a debate between Tom Campbell and several economists on the merits of 
merger to monopoly on the selling side as a response to a buyer monopoly.  The responses 
seem the more persuasive.  Compare Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (2007) (arguing that allowing producers to merge when there is only 
one or a small number of purchasers leads to increased economic efficiency), with Jonathan 
B. Baker et al., Merger to Monopoly to Serve a Single Buyer: Comment, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 
637 (2008) (rebutting Campbell’s Bilateral Monopoly thesis by arguing output is likely to 
increase when buyers have more than one seller with whom to negotiate).  But see Tom 
Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly: Further Comment, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 647 (2008) 
(responding to Baker et. al., criticisms). 
 136. In general, power buyer defenses seem to justify mergers that only marginally 
increase concentration on the selling side.  A similar restrained acceptance of such a defense 
would be the most that ought to be acceptable on the buyer side with respect to seller power.  
Basically, some modest increase in concentration might produce the incentives and 
resources to overcome a supply oligopoly. 
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buyer power, while acknowledging the risks such mergers can create and 
recognizing in part the unique aspects of such mergers, has not sufficiently 
explicated the framework necessary to evaluate the potential 
anticompetitive consequences of such mergers. 
This article provides one view of the scope and nature of the 
competitive issues and suggests how such mergers should be examined on 
their merits.  A well-informed merger review process will develop these 
issues further and provide guidance to potential merger partners, their 
lawyers, and the agency staff. 
 
 
